September, 1991 - Standley H. Hoch Chairman and CEO of GPU, was forced to resign after it was disclosed he was having an affair with Susan Schepman, vice president of communications.
February 7, 1993 - Unauthorized Forced Entry into the Protected Area at Three Mile Island Unit-1. An intruder drove past TMI's guarded entrance gate, crashed through a protected area fence, crashed through the turbine building roll-up door, and hid in a darkened basement of the plant for almost four hours before being apprehended by guards.
On February 11, 1993 - the NRC's top safety official Thomas Murley wasn't sure if any regulations had been violated during the incident at TMI. Nineteen days later, Samuel Collins head of the NRC's investigation team announced: "An individual can challenge the security events that currently exist.
March 5, 1993 - The NRC issued a Notice of Violation "related to an event which resulted when an Auxiliary Operator (AO) bypassed river water from both Decay Heat Service Coolers (DC-C -2A/B) affecting both trains of the Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water System" (GPU Nuclear response to NOV, August 17, 1993.)
June 18, 1993 - GPU took the 'A' emergency diesel generator out of service four days earlier for the annual maintenance inspection. An NRC inspector noted a discrepancy on testing patterns on June 14, 1993, and on June 18 "while performing post-maintenance testing on the 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG), the licensee noted that while the diesel was paralleled to off-site power, the diesel electrical load was erratic" (IR 50-289/93-13 & 50-320/93-06.)"
June 24 to July 1, 1993 - During an NRC inspection, the staff found an "inadequate surveillance procedure, the bolts for the 'B' diesel generator (EDG) lubricating oil filter cover were not properly torqued. As a result, the ability of the EDG to continue to perform if called upon in an emergency was uncertain." A Notice of Violation was issued. (IR 50-289/93-14.)
July 2, 1993 - An NRC inspection identified weaknesses in the licensee and local law enforcement agency "intrusion protection strategy" (See February 7 and August 11, 1993 and September 22, 1995 for related incidents.) (IR 50-289/93-12.)
August 1 to September 9, 1993 - During this inspection the following problems were identified: "...inadvertent auto-start of the motor driven emergency feedwater pumps, the inadvertent lifting of the pressurizer power operated relief valve, and the disabling of make pump 1C...movement of fuel with reactor building doors open..." (IR 50-289/93-19.)
August 11, 1993 - The NRC issued two Notice of Violations relating to emergency preparedness (EP.) One violation occurred during the EP exercise conducted from June 7-11, 1993 and involved adequacy of fire protection exit provisions. The other violation dates back to February 7, 1993, and is related to a delay in callout of the emergency response organization. (This violation is being "considered for escalated enforcement." (See February 7 and July 2, 1993 for more information.) (IR 50-289/93-08.)
September 10, 1993 - The plant was shut down for a six-week re-fueling outage. Eighty of the 177 fuel rods were replaced, bringing the total to more than 500 (or 265 metric tons) which have accumulated since the plant started operated in 1974. (When the plant began operation, refueling outages were annually. GPU has now requested, and received, permission to refuel every 24 months.) GPU has claims to have enough storage space in their spent fuel pools to continue accumulating fuel rods until 2014. (Date of license expiration.) As one worker said, "The brass here figures if one woman can have a baby in nine months, maybe nine women can have a baby in one month. So they're bringing more than a thousand workers and are aiming to have this shutdown one of the shortest ever."
"While the plant was shutdown and in mid-loop operation, the licensee shifted electrical power supplies to support maintenance activities, and caused an inadvertent increase in core thermocouple temperatures of about 11 [degrees] F due to a decrease in cooling flow to the decay heat removal heat exchanger" (IR 50-289/93-22.)
September 15, 1993 - During surveillance testing, "250 gallons of water leaked from the 'C' makeup pump casing drain valve, MU-V-172C, because the valve had been inadvertently left open approximately 1.5 turns." (IR 50-289/93-22.)
September 20, 1993 - During testing, an "inadvertent" trip of the reactor protection system channel 'D' occurred.
September 22, 1993 - During a 90 minute interval, "4,600 gallons of water were inadvertently transferred from the reclaimed water storage tank to the Reactor Building sump...Maintenance personnel had opened the reclaimed water supply valve, CA-V-194, to the reactor coolant drain (RCDT) which in turn overflowed to the Reactor Building sump via the opening from the RCDT relief valve. Operators were not alerted to the rising level in the RCDT, because the level instrumentation and high level alarm were out of service." (IR 50-289/93-22.)
September 24, 1993 - "[D]ue to a level difference, about 4000 gallons of water were inadvertently transferred from the fuel transfer canal to the pressurizer..." (IR 50-289/93-22.)
September 25, 1993 - The 'A' emergency diesel generator was inadvertently started.
September 30, 1993 - GPU declared an Event of Potential Public Interest" due a small fire in the 'C' condensate pump.
October 4-8, 1993 - During an announced safety inspection of the radiation program, the NRC issues a violation "regarding the control of personnel access to high radiation areas to prevent inadvertent entry..." The NRC also observed a weakness in "documentation of contractor health physics technicians' qualifications" (IR 50-289/93-23.) (See August 7, 1996, for a related incident.)
October 8, 1993 - "[W]hile filling the 'A' condensate storage tank (CST) from the million gallon tank, 300 to 400 gallons of water spilled through the CST vent." (IR 50-289/93-22.)
October 14, 1993 - During control rod drop testing, "One rod in each of rod groups 1, 3 and 4 initially failed to meet the rod drop (flight) time..." (IR 50-289/93-22.) (See Executive Summary for related events.)
NRC staff reported: "...one day prior to startup from the 10R refueling outage, the licensee noted that one of two reactor coolant system (RCS) pressurizer code safety valves...was leaking at 25 gallons per hour (gph). The leak gradually increased to 58 gph and on November 14, the licensee placed the plant in hot shutdown to attempt to reseat the valve" (IR 50-289/93-25.)
"We found that your staff planned to slightly open the valve at power without a sound technical basis for concluding that the valve would not fully lift. In addition, your staff did not give sufficient consideration to the relative risks of performing the evolution at power versus hot shutdown" (Lawrence T. Doerflien, Chief, Projects Branch No. 4, Division of Reactor Projects, January 6, 1994.)
In other words: "They wanted to do something we didn't want them to do" (Michelle Evans, NRC, February 25, 1994.)
October 15, 1993 - In response to (IN) 92-30, "Falsification of Plant Records," a generic NRC initiative, the NRC "is concerned about the apparent misconduct on the part of the plant individual involved with this record. Because the NRC must be able to rely on the professionalism and integrity of personnel who perform safety-related activities, including log taking and record keeping, such misconduct cannot be tolerated." A NOV was issued.
October 22, 1993 - GPU's score during the latest SALP period was downgraded from a "1" to a"2" in plant operations.
November 14, 1993 - The plant was shut down for a couple of days so GPU could repair a pressurizer code safety valve leaking 720 gallons per day.
November 16, 1993 - "The licensee failed to establish an adequate procedure for draining the reactor coolant system because the operating procedure did not address how to minimize or prevent the spill over of reactor vessel water into the cold legs as the cold legs are drained" (IR 50-289/94-02.)
January 27, 1994 - "Operations management determined that the day shift Outbuilding Auxiliary Operator (AO), on January 27, 1994, inaccurately reported log readings for the fire service water diesel pump without entering the locked building" (IR 50-289/94-21.)
February 23, 1994 - GPU "determined that the spline adapters were installed upside down [for the nuclear river water motor operated valves.]" (IR 50-289/94-13.) (See August 30 and September, 1994; August 17, 1995; and, September 13, 1996 for related issues.) (See February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.)
March 5, 1994 - The reactor coolant system leak rate increased.
March 7, 1994 - GPU reduced power from 100% to 75% due to a leak on the pressurizer spray valve. (See March 17 and May 31, 1994 for related incidents.)
March 17, 1994 - The plant was shut down due to problems with the pressurizer spray valve. (See March 7 and May 31, 1994.)
"Following the shutdown, control rod drive drop testing was performed, and the licensee found that 12 control rod drives had excessive drop times" (IR 50-289-/94-04.) The plant returned to operation on March 23, 1994. (See September 9, 1995 for a related incident. Also, please refer to the Executive Summary, for a complete listing of problems related to control rods.)
March 30, 1994 - A severity level IV violation was issued by King of Prussia for an incident that occurred on November 16, 1993. Another severity IV violation was issued for inaccurate and incomplete log keeping related to the river water fire service diesel.
(March 3, August 1, and November 16, 1993; February 23, March 30, July 12 and September 16, 1994; October 9 and December 4, 1995; September 29, 1996; March 3 , October 4 & 15, and November 20, 1997; February 26, 1998; September 11, 1999; August 24 and October 9, 2001; March 21 and May 30, 2002; and, March 22, 2003.)
May 19, 1994 "...operators failed to recognize that the high range condenser offgas radiation monitor (RM-A-5) was greater than the high alarm setpoint, a condition requiring an Alert declaration. Channel RM-A-5 was in alarm for approximately one hour before the alert condition was recognized. The NRC considered this oversight to an [emergency preparedness] exercise weakness." (IR 50-289/95-05.) (See June 2, 1995; for related incident. More problems relating to the RM-A-5 took place on February 18, and March 21, 28 & 29, 1999.)
May 23, 1994 - An auxiliary operator inadvertently reduced the level deferential in the sodium hydroxide tank/borated water storage tank. The incident prompted a Licensee Event Report. (See December 21, 1996, April 25, 1997; and, February 2, 2000, for related incidents.)
May 31, 1994 - GPU announced a planned shutdown for June 1, 1994 to test for leaks in the condenser. "In March, GPU technicians discovered that 12 of the 69 control rods used to control the nuclear reaction failed to move into position in the 1.66-second time period required by the NRC. Ability to move the rods over the reactor's fuel is critical to plant safety, NRC officials said" ("The Patriot News," May 31, 1994, B4.) (See March 7 and 17, 1994 for related information.) (Also, please refer to the Executive Summary for a complete listing of problems relating to control rods.)
June 6, 1994 - "A worker who was decontaminating piping failed to meet the Radiation Protection Work permit clothing requirements when she treated an area decontaminated before it was radiologically surveyed and released by a Radiological Controls Technician" (Jacques P. Durr, Chief, Projects No. 4, Division of Power Reactors, NRC.)
June 9, 1994 - TMI-1 returned to service after an eight day shutdown. During the plant startup, with reactor power at 20%, the control room operator "noted an unacceptable overlap between the average positions of control rod groups six and seven." A Licensee Event Report was prepared by the licensee. (IR 50-289/94-13.) (See May 31, 1994 for related problems.) (Please refer to the Executive Summary for a complete listing of problems relating to "Control Rods".)
June 29, 1994 - During an inspection of the boric acid corrosion program, several weaknesses were identified including "...the lack of program documentation, program awareness, and program preventive guidance to ensure maintenance is performed on components identified as susceptible before leakage can cause significant corrosion damage. Additionally, there is no formal or documented centralized collection or evaluation group, or a formal feedback mechanism for evaluation of leaks identified by non-surveillance testing activities. These programmatic weaknesses may lead to the reduced assurance that the reactor coolant boundary will have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, rapid propagating failure, or gross rupture" (Michael C. Modes, Chief, Materials Section, Division of Reactor Safety, NRC.)
July 11, 1994 - "Overall, your on-site response during the Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise was acceptable. However, the approximately one hour delay in recognizing plant conditions warranted upgrading the emergency classification to an Alert is considered to be a significant weakness" (Jacques P. Durr, Chief, Projects No. 4, Division of Power Reactors, NRC.)
July 12, 1994 - A through wall leak was discovered in a safety related nuclear service river water pipe.
August 9, 1994 - The NRC reported results of TMI's radioactive waste management and transportation program and identified "minor weaknesses" in the following areas: "auditors' training and qualifications, timeliness of updating isotopic distribution (i.e., scaling) factors, and controls for limiting the public dose from the storage of radioactive waste" (James H. Joyner, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC, August 9, 1994.)
August 30, 1994 - After an inspection of TMI's motor-operated valve program (MOV), NRC staff concluded: "While we recognize the positive actions taken to improve the MOV program, your previous corrective actions have been ineffective regarding the review of MOV test data. Specifically, your process to evaluate dynamic test results is, in our estimation, informal and still lacks adequate guidance for capability calculations. We also consider your independent review of such calculations as not comprehensive.
"Consequently, the violation cited as part of the NRC Inspection 92-80 will remain open for further inspection" Eugene M. Kelly, Chief Systems Section, Division of Reactor Safety. (See February 23, August 30 and September 9, 1994; August 17, 1995; and September 13, 1996 for related incidents. (See February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.)
August 31, 1994 - Power was reduced from 100% to 10% to correct an electrohydraulic control circuit card problem. The problem affected the position of the main turbine control valves.
August 31, 1994 - A Notice of Violation was issued for the incident which occurred on May 23, 1994.
September 8, 1994 - Misalignment with a building spray [BS] transmitter valve was was documented by NRC inspectors. (A similar event occurred in June 1993.) "The BS flow instrument is an important indication used by the control room operators to determine if the safety system is performing as designed in normal and emergency situations" (IR 50-289/94-19.) A Notice of Violation was issued.
September 9, 1994 - A Severity Level IV Violation was issued for the following incident: "The deferral/cancellation of preventive maintenance (PM) tasks on safety-related motor-operated valves without a documented technical justification or assessment of the adequacy of the PM program occurred because Step 4.2.3.D of Ap was misinterpreted" (Richard W. Cooper II, Director, Division of Reactor Projects.) (See February 23 and August 30, 1994; August 17, 1995; and, September 13, 1996 for related incidents.) (See February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.)
September 16, 1994 - Power was reduced to 50% to test problems associated with the condenser. "Small leaks in tubes inside the condenser are allowing river water used for cooling to mix with pure water of the steam system" (GPU Nuclear, "News Release," September 15, 1994.)
September 29, 1994 - Thermal-Services-Inc. and its president Rubin Feldman, were indicted September 29 by a federal grand jury on seven criminal charges, including willful violations of the Atomic Energy Act, a decade-long conspiracy to defraud the US government, false statements and more. The charges are the culmination of a nearly two-year grand jury investigation of the company, which manufactures Thermo-Lag, the ineffective fire barrier material used in more than 70 nuclear reactors [including Three Mile Island]" The Nuclear Monitor, , October 17, 1994.) (For follow-up data, see October 1, 1996 and May 29 and October 23, 1998.)
September 30, 1994 - A Notice of Violation was issued. "Your corrective actions for a June 1993 building spray transmitter valve misalignment event were ineffective in that they did not preclude the repetition of a similar event on September 8, 1994. This violation is an example of the type of event that could be prevented by a comprehensive root cause analysis and corrective action program" (Jacques P. Durr, Chief Projects Branch No. 4, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC, September 30, 1994.)
October 2, 1994 - The emergency diesel generator (EG-Y-B) started automatically. "TMI failed to report the automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature within four hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72. Our decision not to cite this item is based on the NRC enforcement policy goal of encouraging licensees to aggressively and thoroughly pursue self-identification and correction of problems" (Jacques P. Durr, Chief, Projects Branch No.4, Division of Reactor Projects, November 15, 1994.)
October 24, 1994 - The NRC inspection "team noted instances where administrative requirements, which prescribe operator performance standards, do not accurately reflect management expectations" (Richard W. Cooper II, Director, Division of Reactor Projects.) A Notice of Violation was issued.
November 4, 1994 - "Although our review revealed a number of issues, which constituted a reduction in commitments from the plan previously accepted by the NRC as tabulated in Attachment 1 [GPUN, April 19, 1994] the operation quality plan continues to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. In the future, submittals should be made thoroughly evaluated to determine if a change constitutes a reduction previously approved by the NRC" Michael C. Modes, Chief, Materials Section, Division of Reactor Safety. The NRC later asked GPU to "destroy" this communication because of "an inadequate review by the NRC" (Michael C. Modes, December 5, 1994.)
December, 1994 - GPU Nuclear joined a consortium of 33 nuclear utilities pressuring the Mescalero Apaches to accept high-level radioactive waste. (See June 1997, for a related development.)
December 3, 1994 - Power was reduced to 50% to repair a "water leak", i.e. repair main condenser tube leaks. In addition, 145 of the the condenser's 66,000 tubes were "removed." The plant returned to "full-power" on on December 7, 1994.
"And the week of December 1 to 7, in fact readings were a bit higher. But they were higher in all five [low-volume air sampler] stations...Could use a control station...I'll try and get a hold of GPU next week and see if they got same high readings...[May be] environmental blips we get once in awhile" (John Leutzelschwab, December 24, 1994, phone message.)
December 5, 1994 - During a review of the Quality Assurance Plan a "number of instances" were "revealed...which represent an apparent reduction in commitment from the program previously accepted by the NRC..." (Michael C. Modes, Chief, Materials Section, Division of Reactor Safety.)
December 15, 1994 - "Operators were investigating the decrease in power [plant output] when a phone call from a member of the public alerted them of steam coming from the turbine roof. This led them to identify that steam was flowing through the relief valve for the 'A' second stage feedwater (FEW) heater (HV-V-13A). This resulted in steam from the secondary plant being released to atmosphere through MS-V-103 to the turbine building roof." (IR 50-289/94-26.)
January 10, 1995 - "...the inspectors did identify a tagging activity related to the battery charger that was not well controlled due to an inconsistent understanding of management's expectations for the control and restoration of equipment" (Jacques P. Durr, Chief, Projects Branch No. 4, Division of Reactor Projects.)
February 13, 1995 - "The inspector reviewed a radiological incident report that documented the failure by radiological controls technicians to identify contamination on the same individual on a number of occasions...The licensee's staff calculated the exposure to the worker from the contamination event and assigned 236 millirems to the skin of the whole body." (NRC IR 50-289/95-09 & 50-320/95-03, September 29, 1995.)
March 7, 1995 - A reactor coolant leak of approximately 15 gallons per minute developed.
March 8, 1995 - Radioactive water leaked and contaminated a worker. An Unusual Event was declared.
June 2, 1995 - "An exercise weakness was identified in the area off-site dose assessment and projection...One unresolved item was identified concerning your protective action recommendation (PAR) logic's conformity with Federal guidance...Your PAR logic diagram's methodology is overly reliant on evacuation time estimates and release duration, without due consideration of radiation doses that could be received." James H. Joyner, Chief, Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRC.) (See May 19, 1994 for related incident.)
August 17, 1995 - "A weakness was noted in the plant response to the degraded condition of the safety related 'B' nuclear river (NR) water pump discharge check valve NR-V-20B. The check valve was declared inoperable after the plant operators noticed the 'B' NR pump rotating backwards on two separate occasions. When the problem was first noted on June 10, 1995, the check valve condition, pump performance, and understanding of the pump discharge MOV operation were not evaluated thoroughly to ensure that the NR system was performing acceptably. The performance of the pump inservice surveillance test on June 28, 1995, revealed that the condition of the check valve was degraded. Ultimately, a thorough engineering evaluation, performed at the request of the plant review group, did determine that the NR system was operable between June 10 and 28, 1995." (Jacques P. Durr, Chief, Projects branch No. 4, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC.) (See October 10 and December 4, 1995 for follow-up.)
(See February 26, 1998 for a follow up reprimand relating to the MOV.)
September 9, 1995 - A nonisolable leak in the reactor coolant system located in one of the cold legs of steam generator 'A' was detected. GPU plans to reweld the fatigue crack.
September 9, 1995 - Several control rods exceeded the technical specification (TS) drop time. "Of the seven rods exceeding the TS criteria, four had exceeded the criteria in March [17] 1994, the other three had never exceeded the criteria." (NRC, Region I.)
(Please refer to the Executive Summary for a complete listing of problems relating to the control rods.)
September 9, 1995 - Inspectors reviewed a crack in the reactor coolant system drain line and identified the following weaknesses and errors: "(1) failures in the design verification process, (2) discrepancies with design-related documents, and (3) apparent weaknesses in engineering management's control of the design process. More significantly, while reviewing GPUN's response to past problems with the drain lines, the inspectors identified activities that appear to be in violation of NRC requirements." (James T. Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division of Nuclear Safety, November 7, 1995.) (See March 11, 1996 for a Severity Level III Violation and October 29, 1996 for follow-up.)
September 12, 1995 - "There was a momentary interruption of decay heat removal (DHR) flow to to the reactor core due to an inadvertent closure of the pump suction isolation valve DH-V-1." (See October 10, 1995.) (IR 50-289/95-13.)
September 22, 1995 - Four security breaches were reported to the NRC in September 1995. (See February 7, 1993, October 10 and 11 and November 16, 1995 and March 1 and 26, 1996.)
September 28, 1995 - Approximately 23% of the fuel assemblies were discovered to to have excessive amounts of corrosion. (See March 13 and 31, 1992.)
October 10, 1995 - "A number of issues have occurred that raise concern regarding the adequacy of your planning process for maintenance activities. Examples of these include, maintenance on instrument line fittings which resulted in a reactor coolant system leak, replacement of an emergency safeguards actuation system relay that resulted in an interruption of decay heat removal capability [See September 22, 1995] , and a weak initial response to the degraded condition of the nuclear river discharge check valve that resulted in a delay in identifying the degraded condition of the nuclear river water system. [See August 17, 1995.] Most significant of the work planning issues was the work on the circulating pumps that resulted in breaches of the security boundary." (See September 22, 1995 for background data and October 11 and November 16,1995 for follow-up.) Richard W. Cooper, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC.)
October 11, 1995 - "... one apparent violation was identified involving multiple examples of failure to provide compensatory measures prior to causing breaches in the protected area barrier." (C.W. Hehl, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, NRC.) (See September 22, October 10 and November 16, 1995 and March 1 and 26, 1996.)
October 12, 1995 - An inadvertent heat sink protection system actuation occurred for the 'B' OTSG.
October 31, 1995 - "...the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV), a Class I valve, was returned to service without performing an IST [In Service Testing] to verify proper valve operation after the PORV was replaced. As a result, a wiring error, that prevented the PORV from opening in response to an automatic manual signal, was not detected. Consequently, the PORV was inoperable for the operating cycle from October, 1995, until September, 1997." [NRC 50-289/97-09 (EA 97-533), May 1, 1998.] A Notice of Violation was issued by the NRC. (See January 27, 1998, for an incident involving the PORV.)
November 16, 1995 - A Violation of Severity Level IV was issued for security breaches that occurred, on or around, September 22, 1995. "...the NRC is concerned with the manner in which the vulnerabilities were identified, the amount of time between identifying the first and the second vulnerability, the thoroughness of the corrective actions, and the communication weaknesses identified during the inspection." (James T. Wiggins, NRC, Division of Reactor Safety, November 16, 1995.)
December 4, 1995 - The NRC identified an "area of concern" relating to "a clogged strainer for a decay river pump. Considering the potential generic concern with the other safety related river water pumps, it appears that a more timely approach was warranted to ensure the operability of the non-running pumps." (See August 10, 1995 for a related incident.)
Additionally, a Notice of Violation was issued "regarding failure to follow radiological control procedures for control of a radiography area." (Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief, Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC.)
December 6, 1995 - An inadvertent opening of an electrical breaker [RR-V-1A] was identified by control room operators.
March 1, 1996 - The NRC identified an "apparent violation" which may necessitate "escalated enforcement action."
The apparent violation involved the failure to provide adequate compensatory measures during maintenance activities in the protected area, which enhanced the potential for an unauthorized individual to gain access from the owner-controlled area. Due to this event being similar to other security events that occurred in September 1995 and for which you were cited with a violation, the NRC is concerned about the implementation and effectiveness of corrective actions to prevent recurrence of that type of violation that were provided in your "Response to Notice of Violation", dated December 20, 1995. Additionally, the NRC interviews during the inspection period, as discussed with you, during the inspection exit meeting on February 23, 1996, revealed that there is a lack of alertness to security requirements by workers in the Operations, Maintenance, Planning, and Security departments.
(James T. Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.)
(See March 26, 1996 for related event.)
March 11, 1996 - The NRC reprimanded GPU Nuclear and issued a Severity Level III Violation for continued cracks and leaks in the reactor coolant system. The NRC opted to waived a $50,000 fine and extended "credit" because TMI "has not been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last 2 years..." The NRC noted chronic problems with drain lines. (See September 9, 1995. Also, see October 29, 1996 for follow-up.)
GPUN could provide no documentation to demonstrate that the modifications were ever properly dispositioned. In addition, GPUN's design verification process failed to identify a significant error in the 1990 analysis that resulted in GPUN underestimating the level of over stress in the pipe. GPUN indicated to the NRC, at the predecisional enforcement conference and during subsequent telephone conversations that when the error in the 1990 analysis was corrected, the stresses in the piping were approximately 100% above the code allowable. These failures led to the RCS being returned to service in a degraded condition for the past five years without any additional evaluation, monitoring or inspection, until the support configuration was modified during the 1995 refueling outage. (Thomas T. Martin, NRC, Regional Administrator.)
March 26, 1996 - The NRC issues another Severity Level III Violation for "a security degradation that existed at the facility for approximately one day in February 1996...This failure is significant because three similar degradations had occurred in September 1995 (and were the subject of a predecisional enforcement conference with you on October 25, 1995.) In our view, the corrective actions taken in response to the violation cited for those degradations should have prevented this recent violation from occurring." However, the NRC once again issued GPU "credit" and opted not to assess a base civil penalty of $50,000. (Thomas T. Martin, NRC, Regional Administrator.) (See September 22, October 10 and November 16, 1995 and March 1, 1996, for related events.)
May 15, 1996 - A Severity Level IV violation was issued relating to a Senior Reactor Operator's (SRO) "review of the Auxiliary Building filter replacement, and subsequent shift SROs' and operations, management's decision to wait for the Plant Review Group Evaluation evaluation of the filter issue, resulted in the untimely entry and documentation of the applicable 7 day TS limiting condition for operation (LCO)." Peter W. Eselgroth, NRC, Chief, Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects.)
July 1996 - GPU evaluates how to increase efficiency and reduce staff at TMI and Oyster Creek.
August 7, 1996 - A violation was issued "for the improper control of a posted high radiation area entrance...This is a repeat problem involving a worker sensitivity to plant rules and regulations." (See October 4-8, 1993, for a related incident.) (Peter W. Eselgroth, NRC, Chief Projects Branch No. 7, Division or Reactor Projects, November 14, 1996.)
August 18, 1996 - "A contractor supervisor [Raytheon Nuclear] at GPU Nuclear Corp.'s Three Mile Island (TMI) tested positive for a controlled substance last week and was escorted from the site." ("Inside NRC"). (See February 19, March 7 and 12 and June 15, 1987; July 19 and 30, 1991; and, July 29, August 29, 1992, and February 10, 2000 for related incidents.)
September 13, 1996 - SALP grades plummeted to a "2" in Engineering and Plant Support for the period of February 19, 1995 through August 3, 1996.
September 13, 1996 - A Notice of Violation was issued relating to problems in TMI's Motor-Operated Valve Program: "...the program has remained substantially incomplete 18 months later, with several fundamental weaknesses, ineffective oversight, and an apparent lack of ownership." (NRC, Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief, Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects.) (See February 23, August 30 and September 9, 1994; and, August 17, 1995 for related incidents.) (See February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.)
September 29, 1996 - A NOV was issued when "...a scaffold was tied-off and supported by a safety related pipe support for the nuclear river water system without prior engineering evaluation and approval" (IR/NOV 50-289/96-07. ) See November 5 and December 6, 1996, for related incidents.)
October 1, 1996 - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) fined Thermal Science, Inc. (TSI) $900,000 for "deliberately providing inaccurate or incomplete information to the NRC concerning TSI's fire endurance and ampacity testing programs." (James Lieberman, Director of Enforcement.) The fine was the largest assessed against a nuclear contractor and the second highest in the agency's history. In 1992, the NRC declared TSI's fire barrier, Thermo-Lag, "inoperable." (For a related incident, see September 29, 1994 and May 29 and October 23, 1998.)
October 14, 1996 - GPU agreed to pay a $210,000 fine for violations identified by the NRC between November 1996 and May 1997 including: inadequate engineering design controls; improperly downgrading safety equipment; and, inadequate implementation of the plant's emergency preparedness program. (See March 4 and 5, 1997, for background information.)
October 29, 1996 - [See March 11, 1996 for background.] "We disagree with part of your response to the second violation in which you suggest that the use of engineering judgment to evaluate nonconforming conditions, in lieu of specific ASME code requirements, is acceptable and within the guidance of ASME Section XI...We disagree with that position." (James T. Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.) (Also, see September 9, 1995 and January 17, 1997, for related events.)
November 1996 - The Allegheny Electric Cooperative filed suit with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission against GPU Energy. (See May 22, 1997.)
November 5, 1996 - A NOV was issued when " a scaffold was used to lift the motor of valve MU-V-14A, inside the protected area, before the operations department reviewed and approved that the scaffold's final installation would not endanger emergency safeguards equipment." (IR/NOV 50-289/96-07.) (See September 29 and December 6, 1996, for related incidents.)
November 7, 1996 - Inservice Test Program (IR 96-08):
"We understand that you have committed to add to your IST program the 28 ASME Class 2 and 3 relief valves and the four decay heat removal pump casing vent valves listed in this report, as well as to reconsider formalized treatment of this finding within the corrective action program. We consider the exclusion of the 32 valves in question, in numerous safety related systems, to have regulatory significance." (A. Randolph Blough, NRC, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety.) (See February 26, 1998 for a follow-up reprimand.) (Also, see September 9 and October 31, 1995; October 29 and November 7, 1996; January 17, 1997; and, December 26, 1998, for related incidents.)
November 12, 1996 - GPU reported an "outside design basis" event relating to the 4160 volt AC switch gear. (Event 31323.) (Please refer to August, 1999.)
December 6, 1996 - A Notice of Violation was issued for scaffold related incidents on September 29 and November 5, 1996.
December 21, 1996 - GPU reported that the reactor was "outside the design basis", due to concerns caused by a recent evaluation of the borated water switch over tank. (Event, 31497.)
(See August, 1999, for follow-up report.)
(Also, please refer to May 23, 1994, April 25, 1997; and, February 2, 2000, for related incidents.)
January 17, 1997 - GPU reported another "outside design basis" event report to concerns that various systems could exceed ASME stress codes. (Event 31613.)
(See September 9 and October 31, 1995; October 29 and November 7, 1996; and, December 26, 1998, for related incidents.)
January 22, 1997 - "The quality of corrective actions [emergency core cooling systems] identified in event or near miss capture forms, as well as tracking of the actions, was reviewed. We found that the quality varied by department and that improvement is needed in the engineering area." (Peter W. Eselgroth, NRC, Chief Projects Branch No. 7. Division of Reactor Projects.)
February 24, 1997 - GPU reported an "outside design basis" event relating to the suction piping of an idle high pressure injection (makeup) pump. (Event 31839.) (See August, 1999, for a follow-up report.)
March 4, 1997 - The NRC "determined that numerous safety related components were improperly downgraded from the 'nuclear safety related' classification to a lower tier classification without appropriate safety evaluations or other supporting engineering documentation...Moreover, we are concerned about the poor implementation of the component classification process, as well as related weaknesses in procedure adherence and communications. We are also concerned about the ineffective oversight of the process by management, especially related to not taking prompt action to evaluate and resolve program problems identified by your own quality assurance activities. Because of the considerable extent of the process weaknesses, we also question the broader implications of these problems for other engineering processes."(NRC, Hubert J. Miller, Regional Administrator.) (See March 20 and October 10, 1997, for for data relating to the $50,000 fine levied by the NRC against GPU Nuclear.)
March 5-7,1997 - The NRC identified four exercise weaknesses: 1) the ERO failed to recognize a General Emergency when warranted by plant conditions; 2) the ERO staff incorrectly evaluated steam generator tube leakage; 3) the technical analysis of simulated accident conditions provided to ERO managers by the Technical Support Center staff was inadequate; and 4) the Emergency Operations Facility staff did not assess, and discuss with off site officials, the need for protective action recommendations for residents outside of the 10-mile emergency planning zone when dose projections appeared to indicate that protective action guidelines would be exceeded, Additionally, we were unable to evaluate your actions to correct a radiation dose assessment weakness from the April, 1995 full-participation exercise due to similar malfunctions and controller actions which resulted in incorrect radiological data being provided to the field monitoring teams...
"These findings represent a significant degradation in performance since the last full-participation exercise."
(NRC, James T. Wiggins, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.) (See October 10, 1997 for information relating to the $55,000 fine. Also, background information can be found on March 12, April 24 and June 27, 1997.)
March 12, 1997 - During an emergency preparedness exercise, "the NRC inspection team identified four exercise weaknesses, as follows: 1) the emergency response organization (ERO) failed to recognize a General Emergency when warranted by plant conditions; 2) the ERO staff incorrectly evaluated steam generator tube leakage; 3) the technical analysis of simulated accident conditions provided to ERO managers by the Technical Support Staff Center was inadequate; and 4) the Emergency Operations Facility staff did not initiate protective action recommendations to off site officials for residents outside of the 10-mile emergency planning zone when dose projections appeared to indicate that protective action guidelines would be exceeded. During the post-exercise critique, your organization identified several significant problems, but did not identify weaknesses 2 & 4 above. Additionally, it appeared us that your critique emphasized the impact of the simulation and procedural deficiencies rather than the identified problems...the NRC views the identified weaknesses and problems as important findings, requiring prompt corrective action."
(NRC, Hubert J. Miller, Regional Administrator.)
(See April, 24 and June 27, 1997 for related information, and October 10, 1997 for data relating to the $55,000 fine.)
March 20, 1997 - "An inspection of your quality classification list and component downgrade program determined that your implementation of the component classification process was poor." (NRC, Charles W. Hehl, Director, Division of Reactor Projects.) (See March 20 and October 19, 1997 for background information and data relating to the $50,000 fine.) (Also, see February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.)
"Between June 1, 1992, and March 2, 1997, GPUN did not correctly identify deficiencies in the supporting documentation for the safety classification of components to preclude repetition of problems with insufficient documentation in support of QCL activities." (IR 50-289/98-08.)
April 10, 1997 - GPU reported another "outside design basis" event. (32124.) (See August, 1999, for more information.)
April 25, 1997 - "Based on review of findings (unresolved items) in reference 1, we have identified seven apparent violations associated with Technical Specifications...A predecisional enforcement conference to discuss these apparent violations has been scheduled for May 22, 1997...."
(1) design control weaknesses in the performance of calculations and in the control of calculations used in the analysis for switch over to decay heat removal system (DHRS) pump suction from the borated water storage tank (BWST) to the reactor building sump under post-accident conditions (See May 23, 1994, April 25, 1997, December 21, 1996; and, February 2, 2000, for related incidents);
(2) calculations that were being performed in documents, such as memoranda, technical data reports, and plant engineering evaluation requests, that do not comply with your engineering procedures for calculations;
(3) nonconservative assumptions and missing inputs in calculations for the makeup pumps and makeup tank;
(4) a potential unreviewed safety question when evaluating a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) change regarding the net positive suction head of the DHRS pumps; and,
(5) untimely and ineffective actions relative to dispositioning of licensee identified deficiencies associated with the Quality Classification List. [See February 26, 1998 for follow-up reprimand.] (NRC, Charles W. Hehl, Director, Division of Reactor Project.) (See October 10, 1997 for information relating to the $210,000 fine assessed against GPU Nuclear.)
April 24, 1997 - "During the inspection, [Emergency Preparedness Exercise
May 22, 1997 - PUC Chairman John M. Quain has been selected to mediate a dispute filed by the Allegheny Electric Cooperative (AEC) with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission against GPU Energy (GPU). In November 1996 the AEC charged GPU "was providing 'abysmally bad' service, including cutting back maintenance in rural areas, because it needed to save money in a soon-to-be competitive environment and saw the rural electric co-ops as future competition for the same customers." ("The Patriot News", May 22, 1997 B9.)
AEC's complaint to FERC was a resolved in the Fall, 1999, during GPU Energy's Joint Petition for Full Settlement.
May 29, 1997 - Two apparent violations were identified by the NRC during an inspection on April 27, 1997. "First, your staff identified that during the period of about March 17, 1986 until March 23, 1997, there was no reasonable assurance that the reactor building emergency cooling fans, AH-E-1A, 1B, & 1C would have functioned under post-LOCA environment conditions because their motors were not environmentally qualified. There was a small length of exposed metal between the heat shrink tubing and the spark plug porcelain connector to the motor. In addition, the inspectors concluded that your process for and the timeliness of addressing corrective actions of the condition of AH-E-1B & 1C upon identifying the condition of AH-E-1A was weak."
June, 1997 - "Some utilities, GPU included, are looking outside the federal government to address the problem [spent nuclear fuel]. last December 10. nuclear electric utilities entered into discussions with the Skull Valley Goshutes Indian tribe in Utah to establish a private fuel storage facility on tribal grounds.
"Under the proposal, the spent fuel from the 10 utilities would be placed in steel canisters and then in reinforced concrete casks. the facility would be used only until the federal repository begins operations. The project time line calls for the NRC licensee fueling this summer with final approvals and construction beginning in three to five years." GPU Nuclear Perspectives, Information for Opinion Leaders Around the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. (See December, 1994, for a related incident.)
June 21, 1997 - Due to the loss of off site power caused by the failure of electrical problems with two damaged substation generator breakers, TMI was forced to shut down for eight days. (See August 19, 1997, for the NRC's follow-up evaluation.)
June 21, 1997 - GPU also identified another "outside design basis" event relating to the failure of three control rods failing to meet tech spec insertion times. (Event 32522.) (See August, 1999, and Executive Summary for related problems.)
June 27, 1997 - Remediation of the four weaknesses displayed during the March [Emergency preparedness] exercise was adequately demonstrated during this exercise...However, two of those weaknesses (i.e., the failure to recognize a General Emergency condition, and the failure to assess the need for a protective action recommendation (PAR) outside of 10 miles) are apparent violations which remain open, pending consideration of escalated enforcement action ..." (James T. Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.) Continued on the following page...
(See August 19, 1997, for the NRC's follow-up evaluation and October 10, 1997 for the $55,000 fine. Additional background data can be found on March 12, 1997.)
July 3, 1997 - GPU requested, and was granted permission, to be exempted from criticality monitors for special nuclear materials. "The Commission['s] technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and has determined that inadvertent criticality is not likely to occur in special nuclear materials handling or storage areas at TMI-1. The quantity of special nuclear material other than fuel that is stored on site is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass." (Federal Register, July 11, 1997, Volume 62, Number 133, pp. 37317-37318.)
July 23, 1997 - During an NRC inspection of the motor-operated valve program, a Notice of Violation was identified.
July 28, 1997 - GPU "declared the 'B' train of low pressure injection and building spray inoperable because these systems are affected by the transfer from the borated water storage tank to the reactor building sump. This places the unit in a 72-hour technical specification limiting condition for operation." [Event date: July 25, 1997.] (NRC Region I, IHQ OPS Officer, Leigh Trocine.)
August 19, 1997 - "The [NRC] inspector noted that your staff had planned to determine the cause of unbalanced current condition observed in these breakers by a substation technician prior to the LOOP [loss of off site power] event on June 21, 1997. Even though your staff had planned to troubleshoot the condition, this issue was not properly documented per your corrective action process and plant management was not made aware of this anomaly prior to the LOOP event. Therefore, we are considering this an unresolved open item until our final review is done." Peter W. Eselgroth, NRC, Chief of Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects.)
October 4, 1997 - "...upon raising of the [reactor vessel head] seal plate numerous hot particles were discovered by the RCT [Rad Con Technician.] " The NRC issued a Notice of Violation. [NRC 50-289/97-09 (EA 97-533) ]. (See February 26, 1998 for follow-up SALP information.) (For problems relating to the reactor vessel see November 16, 1993; March 30, 1994; March 4 and October 15, 1997; September 11, 1999; October 9, 2001 & March 21, 2002.)
October 10, 1997 - The NRC fined GPU Nuclear $210,000 for four violations at TMI-1 including: $50,000 for inadequate design controls, including the use of incorrect numbers for calculations and inadequate verification of safety evaluations [See April 25, 1997, (1) through (4) for more information]; $50,000 for improperly downgrading some safety-related equipment without providing proper evaluations or documentation {See March 4, 1997 for background data]; $55,000 for failing to address outstanding problems in a timely fashion [See April 25, 1997, (5) for more documentation]; and, $55,000 for the flawed emergency training exercise held on March 5, 1996 [See June 27 and August 19, 1997 for related information]. ("The Patriot News", October 10, 1997.)
October 15, 1997 - GPU failed to implement operating procedures during the filling and venting of the reactor coolant system (RCS). "Consequently, approximately 50 gallons of RCS water overflowed out of the CRDM [control rod drive mechanism] vents onto the reactor vessel head area." (NRC 50-289/97-09 [EA 97-433 & 50-289/97-10).
The NRC issued a Notice of Violation.
(For problems relating to the reactor vessel see November 16, 1993; March 30, 1994; March 4 and October 4, 1997; February 26, 1998; September 11, 1999; October 9, 2001 & March 21, 2002.)
November 20, 1997 - The NRC issued a Notice of Violation when GPU failed to "review and approve a substantive change to an existing inservice test (IST) surveillance procedure 1300-3K, "IST of Reactor River Water Pumps and Valves," before the closure of the reactor building emergency cooler inlet and outlet valves to conduct a leak test. The IST procedure was written and approved to determine the cooler and inlet and outlet open and closed times, but did not allow the valves to be closed for the seven hour leak rate test." (NRC 50-289/97-09 [EA 97-433 & 50/289/97-10).
December 19, 1997 - The NRC launched an investigation at TMI-1 trying to identify why GPU failed to detect that the pressure [operated]-relive valve [the same valve that failed at Unit-2 and caused the March 1979 nuclear accident] was inoperable for two years:
"... the regulatory agency [NRC] said the findings are serious enough to warrant a Monday [December 22, 1997] meeting in the NRC's suburban Philadelphia offices to determine why they occurred [four maintenance related problems under NRC review.]
"In the recent past, we have a seen a number of areas that we are concerned about, and we are going to bring them in on Monday to find out more about it, " said NRC spokesman Neil A. Sheehan. "As far as public health and safety, we believe the public was protected.
"These problems mostly reflect personnel error, carelessness on the part of their work staff," Sheehan said. ("Patriot News", December 19, 1997, B) (See Executive Summary for numerous related incidents listed under "Housekeeping Flaws.")
At GPUN's other nuclear power plant, Oyster Creek, the NRC cited the Company for six violations of NRC code and Hubert Miller, Regional Administrator, stated that the problems were "repetitive violations caused by human error. Miller added, "[They were] part of a larger trend of human errors at Oyster Creek."
The violations included performing electrical repairs without notifying the control room supervisor and sending soil contaminated by low-level radioactivity to a local landfill.
January 27, 1998 - A Violation was issued for a problem identified by the NRC in IR 97-09. The PORV was inoperable "due to being miswired and failure to perform post-maintenance test(s) following replacement during 11R refueling outage.
(See October 31, 1995, for an incident involving the PORV.)
February 18, 1998 - A missing Thermo-Lag barrier was identified. (LER 98-003-00; March 19, 1998.) (See May 29, July 17, October 23, 1998, for related incidents.)
February 19, 1998 - GPU reported another "outside design basis" event related to problems with the flow instrumentation. (Event 33749.) (See August, 199, for a follow-up report.)
February 26, 1998 - During the SALP evaluation period (August 5, 1996- January 24, 1998), the NRC observed:
...performance declined in the engineering area; the second consecutive assessment in which a decline was noted, indicating that previous efforts to improve performance in that area was not effective...on occasion the operators did not rigorously follow approved procedures, the most noteworthy example resulted in a reactor coolant system overfill....Significant problems were identified in many engineering program areas. Examples included problems with Inservice Testing (IST), the Motor Operated Relief Valve (MOV) programs, the Quality Classification List (QCL) Process, and technical support. Adverse findings associated with engineering performance, which were identified by oversight groups, were not effectively addressed until eventually found by the NRC...Overall performance in the radiation protection area was good, though there were some problems in the controls of hot particles, and posting and monitoring of areas within the radiologically controlled area...Some significant problems were identified during the March 1997 emergency drill, which required a remedial drill be conducted. These performance problems highlighted ineffective management in the emergency preparedness area.
(Hubert J. Miller, NRC, Regional Administrator, February 26, 1998.)
February 26, 1998 - "...in numerous instances your organization has not taken appropriate and timely action to correct known adverse conditions. Engineering work backlog to resolve issues continues to grow as you have not established an effective corrective action tracking and resource planning process. Further senior management attention to manage the existing corrective action backlog and to address long standing engineering issues is warranted...
"Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a violation of NRC requirements has occurred...This violation is of concern because this is a second example where plant operators used a procedure that did not meet the intent of the activity performed. Specifically, the inspectors identified a failure of your operations staff to employ a reviewed and approved procedure to perform a troubleshooting leak check of the reactor building emergency coolers." (NRC Integrated IR 50-289/97-10 & 50-320/97-03 & Notice of Violation.)
(For problems relating to the reactor vessel see November 16, 1993; March 30, 1994; March 4 and October 4 & 15, 1997; September 11, 1999; October 9, 2001 & March 21, 2002.)
April 9, 1998 - "Following self-identification of a minor non-safety significant missed technical specification sampling requirement on the spent fuel pool, your staff focused too narrowly on the root cause as documented in LER 98-002." [Missed Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Sample Following a Water Addition. {Section E8.1} (IR 50-289/98-01.)
May 29, 1998 - "In an order confirming GPU Nuclear Inc.'s commitment to replace Thermo-Lag fire barrier material, federal officials yesterday notified the utility that its efforts may not be enough to complete the work on time [December 31, 1999] and, therefore, may not meet regulatory requirements for licensing." (See also March 19, 1987; March 6, 1988; June 12 and September 1 and 3, 1991; July 27 and November 23, 1992; August 11 and September 30, 1993; and, September 29, 1994; October 1, 1996, and, February 18, July 17 & October 23, 1998.)
July 17, 1998- AmerGen Energy announced that it reached an Agreement with GPU to purchase TMI-1 for $100 million. The proposed sale includes $23 million for the reactor, and $77 million, payable over five years, for the nuclear fuel. (See December 20, 1999 for follow-up information, and September 5, 2002, for resale of TMI.)
July 17, 1998 - Thermo-Lag fire barrier was found "incorrectly configured", i.e., outside of the approved joint design agreement. An LER was produced by the Company which resulted in the NRC issuing a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation. (50-289/99-02). (See January 29, 1994; and , February 18, May 29, and, October 23, 1998, for related incidents.)
July 20, 1998 - GPU reported another "outside design basis" related to the check valves. (Event 34542.) (See August, 1999, for a follow-up report.)
August 8, 1998 - The auxiliary and fuel handling building exhaust system post accident radiation monitor had been in "an inoperable condition for 10 days without the knowledge of the licensee." This incident was identified in LER 98-008-00. (IR 05000289/2000-001 & 05000320/2000-001.) (See November 16, 1999, for a related incident.)
August 14, 1998 - GPU reported an LER relating to inoperable intake screen and pump house floor drain check valves. The Company attributed the problem to a "lack of preventative maintenance." The NRC issued a Severity Level IV, Non-Cited Violation.
August 25, 1998 - GPUN identified a Thermo-Lag fire barrier found outside of the approved joint arrangement. (See September 29, 1994; October 1, 1996; and, May 29, July 17, and October 23, 1998, for related events.)
August 25, 1998 - GPUN "identified a situation where operation with a single off site power source, and an ES [emergency safeguard] actuation could cause a complete a loss of off site power (LOOP) to the safety related 4 KV buses. The cause of this issue was previously incorrect assumptions for the impedance of the bus duct between the auxiliary transformers and the 4 KV safety related buses." (IR 50-289/98-05; GPU Events 34680 & 34682.) (See September 16, 1998 for a related incident, and refer to August, 1999, for more information on "outside design basis events.")
August 25, 1998 - GPU filed an LER (98-011-02) related to a Thermo Lag fire barrier installed outside of the approved joint design arrangement.
August 28, 1998 - GPU identified another "outside design basis" event when the control room ventilation damper was found to be partially open. (Event 34710.) (See September 25, 1998, for a follow-up report. Also, refer to August, 1999, for information on "outside design basis" events.)
September 4, 1998 - "We [the NRC] are concerned by your poor control over the documented accident analysis for a loss of feedwater accident and apparent inadequacies in the safety evaluation review of a design basis calculation allowing a reduction in the emergency feedwater flow rate following such an accident. While there does not appear to be an operability problem, these issues raise continuing concern regarding your calculation review process and sensitivity toward the maintenance of the design basis for safety related systems." (IR 50-289/98-03.) (See March 5, 1999, for follow-up developments.)
September 14, 16, 29, and 30, and October 29, 1998 - GPU reported "outside design basis" incidents relating to "missed" fire hose surveillance tests, "missing" Thermo-Lag fire barriers, "improperly installed" Thermo-Lag fire barriers; and, fire barrier "discrepancies." (Events: 34787; 34853; 34856; and, 34973.) (Related incidents detailed on October 15 and 23, 1998. Also, please refer to August , 1999, for more information on "outside design basis incidents.)
September 16, 1998 - GPUN "identified a situation where a loss of one off site power source, with the unit operating at 100% power with assumed maximum balance of plant electrical loading and minimum expected off site grid voltage, could result in a complete LOOP [loss of on site power] to the safety related 4 KV buses. (IR-50-289/98-05.) (See August 25, 1998 for a related incident.)
September 25, 1998 - GPU filed an LER (98-012-00) relating to a "condition where the control room habitability boundary was compromised as a result of a ventilation damper AH-D-270 being found out of its normal condition. AH-D-270 was found approximately 50 percent open which, in the event of a design basis accident, would have allowed unfiltered air from the auxiliary building to be drawn into the emergency control room air treatment system." (NRC IR 50-289/99-02.) (See August 28, 1998, for more information.)
September 30, 1998 - The NRC evaluated the emergency preparedness drill: "A notable deficiency was the failure to complete the necessary off-site agency notifications within the required fifteen minutes after both of the drill event declarations. This deficiency is being classified as an exercise weakness requiring corrective action." (IR 50-289/98-07.)
October 2, 1998 - The NRC "identified a weakness" in GPU's "actions to correct known deficiencies in the calibration of the makeup tank level instruments, that existed between May 1997 and August 1998. These deficiencies included an improper assessment of makeup tank operability, problems with the tracking of open commitments to correct known deficiencies, and the failure to implement calibrations in a timely manner following setpoint calculation changes. The NRC identified this "weakness" as an "apparent violation." Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief, NRC, Projects Branch No. 7, Division of Reactor Projects.
October 15, 1998 - The NRC identified a violation relating to a change GPUN "made to the makeup system cross-connect valves..." (IR 50-289/98-06). James T. Wiggins, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Safety.
October 15, 1998 - GPUN completed an LER regarding failures to perform fire protection program surveillances in a timely fashion. Another LER related to this issue was filed on January 22, 1999. (See September 14, 1998, for precursor events.) (IR 50-289/99-02.)
October 19, 1998 - The NRC observed a failed feedwater heater relief valve.
October 23, 1998 - GPUN discovered 11 incidents dating back to 1987 where Thermo-Lag was improperly installed. "More cases may be discovered as the replacement work continues, NRC officials said." ("Patriot News", October 23, 1998, B1).
(See September 29, 1994; and, February 11, May 29 & July 17, 1998; and, September 14, 1998, to track problems associated with Thermo-Lag.)
October 28, 1998 - A potential violation was identified by NRC inspectors relating to "the potential for bypass of the suppression pool. This issue is a violation of NRC requirements, which could be considered for escalated enforcement and be subject to a civil penalty." The NRC declined to "exercise discretion" and cite GPU for a violation or mandate a civil penalty. (Charles W. Hehl, NRC, Director, Division of Reactor Projects.)
October 29, 1998 - GPU reported more "outside design basis" events relating to fire barrier discrepancies." (Event 34973). (See September 14 and October 5 & 29, 1998, for related developments. Also, please refer to August, 1999, for information on "outside design basis" events.)
December 6, 1998 - An NRC inspector found an emergency diesel generator valve out of position. (IR 50-289/98-06.)
December 16, 1998 - The NRC noted observed "an unexpected increase in the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) and a decrease in makeup tank (MUT) level during work on a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakoff flow transmitter in the reactor building (RB)."
(IR 50-289/98-08.)
January 8, 1999 - GPUN completed an LER when the Company realized it missed technical specification surveillance requirements for "obtaining control rod drive absolute/relative positions." (IR 50-289/99-02). (See Executive Summary for related events.)
January 9 & 19, 1999 - Elevated tritium levels and potential leaks from the waste evaporator condensate storage tank for the months of January, February and March, 1999 were reported. (IR 50-289/99-01).
January 11, 1999 - "As of Cycle 12 startup at TMI-1 (current operation) OTSG "A" has 1300 plugged tubes and OTSG "B" has 395 plugged tubes, totaling 1695 plugged tubes at TMI-1. Each OTSG has 15,531 tubes. The NRC approved limit is a maximum of 2000 total tubes plugged. GPUN has analyzed and submitted for NRC review a request [which has been approved] to revise the tube plugging limit to 20% per OTSG, or 3,106 per OTSG.
"OTSG "A" has 246 tubes sleeved (one previously sleeved tube has been plugged) and OTSG "B" has 253 tubes sleeved." (AmerGen's reply to Eric Epstein, Responses and Concerns Regarding TMI-1 License Transfer Application, January 11, 1999.) (Please refer to January 4, 2000 for an update on the number of plugged tubes at TMI-1.)
As of, January 4, 2000 - "...Total number of tubes plugged in OTSG-A is 1,336 (8.6% of the 15,531 tubes), and the total number of plugged tubes in OTSG-B is 404 (2.6% of the 15,531 tubes."
(AmerGen Letter, 1920-99-20679, Attachment 1, "Topical Report 135.")
(Please see February 18, 1999, for background data.)
The total number of in-service "sleeved tubes":
A = 248 B = 253.
On October 20, 2001, AmerGen issued an LER due to the "degradation from the server of a plugged tube in the B" once through steam generator (OTSG) [AB/SG] had resulted in degrading in an adjacent in-service tube. The damage was such that the degraded tube may not have remained intact under accident conditions. Three (3) other adjacent in-service tubes were damage[d] by the severed plugged tube but would have remained intact under accident conditions...
"The corrective actions in response to the discovery of the condition were de-watering of 870 mechanically plugged tubes prior to plugging/re-plugging, the insertion of stabilizers into plugged tubes or surrounding of plugged tubes with stabilized plugged tubes." (LER No. 2001-002-0, December 14, 2001).
(Steam Generator Problems & Tubes Removed from Service: March 29, October 7, November 22 and 29, 1985; April 18, 1986 and December 18, 1986; March 23 and 31, May 1 and September 22, 1987; March 26 to April 30, June 20 and 21, August 7 and October 30, 1988; January 10 and March 6, 8, 19 and 22, 1990; November 4-8, 1991; and, September 28, 1992; October 12, 1995; March 12, October 10, 1997 (incorrectly evaluated SGT leakage during emergency drill); and April 24, 1997; and, January 11, 1999.)
January 14, 1999 - A malfunction occurred in the Integrated Control System. (See March 4, 1999, for follow-up information).
January 22, 1999 - Another LER was completed by GPUN relating to missed fire surveillance testing. (See October 15, 1998, for background information. Precursor events begin on September 14, 1998.)
January 22, 1999 - Possible problems with boric acid system piping prompted GPU to report another "outside design basis" event. (Event 35300.) (See March 5, 1999 for more data, and refer to August, 1999, for more information on "outside design basis" events.) GPUN submitted a LER on November 22, 1999).
February 12, 1999 - GPUN "identified a condition in which three containment post accident sampling system containment isolation valves exceeded their local leak rate testing limits. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material." An LER was issued and reviewed by the NRC. (IR 50-289/99-04.)
February 18, 1999 - The offgas radiation monitor (RM-A-5) alarm "alerted", and indicated a possible "primary to secondary leakage from the once through steam generator tunes (OTSG) tubes...There was no appreciable increase in the OTSG primary to secondary leakage. The most likely case for this momentary increase was a leaking OTSG tube plug." (IR 50-289/99-01). (See follow-up problems on March 21, 28 & 29, 1999. Also, related problems were documented on May 19, 1994, and June 2, 1995.)
February 24, 1999 - GPUN identified "deficiencies in the alignment of Westinghouse Model DB-25 480 volt switch gear beakers. These deficiencies, which were identified in "non-safety related" applications of these breakers could lead to undetected wiring damage on non-safety and safety related applications." (IR 50-289/99-01).
March 4, 1999 - The Integrated Control System (ICS) core thermal power increased "above the 100 percent rated value of 2568 megawatts thermal (MWt) for approximately 12 minutes. The maximum observed power level was 2573 MWt, at which time the ICS self-corrected and lowered back below the 100 percent rated value...Efforts were ongoing at the end of the period to troubleshoot the exact cause of the ICS transients." (IR 50-289/99-01). (See January 14, 1999, for a similar incident.)
March 5, 1999 - Two violations were identified during an inspection.
"The first deals with failure to follow approved procedures for the control of the emergency boration source for the boric acid mix tank...
"The second apparent violation deals with your failure to properly review a change made to the design basis for the emergency feedwater system. Specifically, you failed to complete a safety evaluation for design basis analysis change to the emergency feedwater system minimum required flow rate to the once through steam generators. Subsequently, we were concerned whether you should have identified these changes as an unreviewed safety question requiring NRC review and approval ...Specifically, you reduced the accident analysis required flow rate, using enhanced accident analysis methods which were different than the original method....Further, your review did not identify that your analysis determined that the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump was not capable of supplying 100 percent of the accident analysis required flow rate as described for on the Technical Specifications..."
(NRC, Wayne L. Schmidt, Acting Chief, Projects Branch 7, Division of Reactor Projects.) (See September 4, 1998 and January 22, 1999, for related developments.)
March 10, 1999 - Potential problems associated with control room pressure control forced GPU to report another "outside design basis" event. (Event 35457.) "...GPUN identified a manual flow balancing damper in the outside air supply duct for the control building emergency ventilation system (CBEVS) failed shut." ( LER 99-003-00.)
(See August, 1999, for information on "outside control basis" issues.)
The NRC determined that this incident was a Non-Cited Violation. (50-289/99-04.)
March 21, 28, & 29, 1999 - The condenser off gas radiation monitor (RM-A-5) alarmed. "In response to repeated momentary alarms from RM-A-5, GPUN raised the alarm setpoint to reduce operator distraction while still providing adequate warning of an increasing primary to secondary leak rate." (IR 50-289/99-02.) (See precursor event on February 18, 1999. Related problems also occurred on May 19, 1994, and June 2, 1995.)
March 26, 1999 - Another violation was issued relating to an "unreviewed safety question, which was implemented without prior NRC approval...Although you have taken corrective action to revise the makeup tank pressure/level curve, this action does not change the NRC's determination that the change to the high pressure injection system valve configuration involved an unreviewed safety question." (NRC, Wayne D. Lanning, Director of Reactor Safety.)
April 16 to May 7, 1999 - A leak was identified in the radioactive liquid waste discharge line. "GPUN completed repairs to the WECST discharge line and the line was retuned to service on May 7. Approximately 70 feet of piping was replaced. Of that, less then ten feet showed evidence of external corrosion. Two through-wall leaks were identified in the ten foot section. The cause of the corrosion was failure of the external protective coating. There was no corrosion identified on any of the other piping sections that were examined." (IR 50-289/99-03.)
May, 1999 - GPU's "independent" self-assessment of Quality in Engineering: Environmental Qualification, "identified several individual and program deficiencies. (Technical data Report No 1241, May, 1999.) (See April 1, 2000, for follow-up NRC evaluation.)
May 10, 1999 - The emergency feedwater pump's outboard motor pump was discovered to be inoperable "since performance of the last IST [inservice test]... The inspector determined that testing. GPUN reasonably could not have known of the failed bearing based on past surveillance testing. Further, at several times in the interim GPUN took various other pieces of EFW equipment out-of-service for testing. This was a TS violation and an apparent escalated enforcement issue (EEI)." (IR 50-289/99-03.)
The NRC "is exercising enforcement discretion to not cite [Non-Cited] this Severity Level III Violation..." (IR 50-289/99-04.) (See August 19, 1999, for more background information and the NRC's justification for leniency.)
May 14, 1999 - Two Severity Level IV Violations were identified. "...the inspectors had concerns with your staff's attention to detail in executing your foreign material exclusion program during the conduct of the inspections...These violations are being treated as Non-Cited Violations..." (Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief, NRC Projects Branch 7, Division of Reactor Projects).
May 13 to June 4, 1999 - The NRC determined that the "May 13 initial operations CAP [Corrective Action Process] operability assessment for the RBEC [Reactor Building Emergency Cooler] high cooling coil differential pressure was inadequate. Further, by May 14 GPUN had not assessed the possibility that the RBEC performance could not affect the planned BS [Reactor Building Spray] system outage.
"GPUN removed the 'A' BS system from service, within the three RBECs in an unjustified degrades system of operability, between May 17 and 20. This was considered an unresolved item pending further review of the June 4 JCO [Justification of for Continued Operation], RBEC operating data, and the GPUN LER on this issue." (IR 50-289/99-03.) (See August 29, 1999 - October 23, 1999, for follow-up data.)
May 14, 1999 -A flood path discovered near the turbine building resulted in GPU reporting another "outside design basis" report. (Event 35717.) (Refer to August, 1999, for information on "outside design basis" events.)
"This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation..." (IR 50-289/99-04.)
May 25, 1999 - GPU determined pressurize support bolts would exceed allowable stress limits. The Company reported another "outside of design basis" event. (Event 35764.) Refer to August, 1999, for more information on "outside design basis" events.)
June 23, 1999 - "Three Mile Island, trying to rid itself of clams, recently released too much of a potentially hazardous chemical into the Susquehanna River...State regulations allow TMI to release 0.3 parts per million of Clamtrol back into the Susquehanna River. For about an hour, the plant was releasing 10,500 gallons per minute containing twice that amount." (York Daily Record, July 7, 1999.)
June 23, 1999 - GPU "discovered the valve line-up used to repressurize the core flood tanks on June 21 had not been properly installed. Two valves upstream of the core flood tank nitrogen isolation valves were found out of their required shut position." (IR 50-289/99-04.) (See July 4, 1999, for a follow-up incident.)
June 26, 1999 - "...with the unit operating at 100% power, the 'B' auxiliary transformer tripped due to a defective fault pressure relay." (IR 50-289/99-04.)
June 29, 1999 - "...a control room operator, distracted by ongoing control rod drive troubleshooting efforts, inadvertently left the deborating demineralizer in service for two hours instead of the 45 minutes requested by Chemistry." (IR 50-289/99-04.)
July 6, 1999 - "...with the unit operating at 100% power, GPUN experienced a sustained low voltage condition on the off-site power transmission system. The low grid voltage resulted from unusually high system demand due to abnormally high outdoor temperatures." (IR 50-289/99-04.)
Also that day, "the feed tank to the miscellaneous waste evaporator was overfilled resulting in a spill of contaminated water in the miscellaneous waste evaporator room."
July 9, 1999 - The NRC conducted an engineering inspection from May 10 to May 28.
"We found that you are addressing previously identified weaknesses in the various engineering program areas...Our review also identified incomplete documentation of your review of the extent of condition of identified problems. This was particularly evident in the resolution of the findings you identified during the environmental qualification self- assessment. The NRC has determined that one Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred regarding the battery surveillance test procedure acceptance criteria. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation..."
(NRC, Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief, Engineering Programs Branch, Division of Reactor Safety.)
July 18, 1999 - "Two of three operating reactor containment (RCB) fans tripped during troubleshooting of engineered safeguards actuation signal (ESAS) relays by a control room operator (CRO)." (NRC, HQ OPS Officer, Steve Sandin.)
July 21, 1999 - The NRC "found the fire door to the C-make-up pump (MU-P-1C) cubicle opened and unattended. The door had been propped open to support the decontamination efforts in the cubicle. Sometime during the decontamination efforts, a team of maintenance technicians entered the cubicle and the decontamination team left. The decontamination team did not close the door as they left, nor did they turn over to the maintenance technicians the fact that the door was required to be closed...This was similar to a condition on the 'A' make-up pump (MU-P-A) cubicle identified by the inspector in the previous inspection period. GPUN entered the issue into the CAP (CAP [Corrective Action Process] T1999-0586). (IR 50-289/99-07).
July 23, 1999 - "...a control room operator (CRO) found an ESAS relay coil overheated and smoking...GPUN experienced problems over the past year during testing when the relays failed to return the fully energized position after being deenergized. In this condition, the relay coil draws an excessive electrical current and overheating can result. Other ESAS relay failures were discussed in two previous inspection reports (IR 50-289/98-08 and 99-03)...No testing was conducted to verify the continued operability of the overheated and smoking relay. GPUN replaced the relay later that same day and verified the operability of the new relay through appropriate post-maintenance testing...Although the relay was ultimately replaced and tested, GPUN's initial response was not timely and did not thoroughly evaluate the degraded relay for continued operability. This example of a weakness in GPUN's implementation of its corrective action process was a minor issue not subject the the formal enforcement process." (IR 50-289/99-07).
GPUN issued a "voluntary LER" (99-007) on August 20, 1999.
July 24, 1999 - "...the high pressure nitrogen system was inadvertently left in service for 15 to 20 hours following repressurization of the core flood tanks." (IR 50-289/99-04.) (See June 3, 1999, for a precursor event.)
August, 1999 - Between 1996-1999, GPU reported 26 "outside design reports" relating to design basis issues. (For specific examples, refer to December 21, 1996 "event" related to core cooling system problem.)
"If a utility has operated the reactor outside of the safety parameters established in its operating license, i.e., "outside design basis," it is required to document it in a daily event report filed with the NRC. The more event reports filed by a nuclear reactor, the less certain that the reactor and its safety systems will operate as designed." (James Riccio, Public Citizen, August, 1999, Executive Summary.)
August 19, 1999 - "GPUN and the NRC determined that the 2B EFW pump was unavailable to perform its safety function, due to the failed bearing, for longer than the TS allowed out of service time of 72 hours. The 2B EFW pump was inoperable from the time of the last automatic actuation start test on March 27, 1999, or earlier, until the time of discovery of the failed bearing on May 10, 1999...Accordingly, in consultation with the Regional Administrator, NRC Region I, and the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized to not issue a Notice of Violation and not propose a civil penalty for this Severity Level III violation..." (Richard V. Crlenjak, NRC, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects.)
August 20, 1999 - The NRC found "a scaffold above the 'B' motor driven emergency feedwater pump (EF-P-2B) that was not seismically supported." (IR 50-289/99-07).
August 29, 1999 through October 23, 1999 - Two severity Level Violations were identified, but the NRC reduced the violations to Non-Cited Violations (NCV). "The NCV's involved: 1) locally operating the 'B' main steam isolation valve, after losing the ability to remotely operate the valve from the control room, without completing a TS required procedure change; and 2) not meeting proceduralized requirements on the availability of the boric acid mix tanks an emergency boration path." (Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief, NRC, Projects Branch 7, Division of Reactor projects, December 3, 1999, Inspection Report, 50-289/99-08.)
During this inspection period the NRC also observed:
"GPUN established an outage shift manning schedule without sufficient contingency to allow for urgent work and job delays, thereby causing overtime usage to exceed the work hour guidelines...GPUN responded adequately to a bent valve stem on the 'A' decay heat injection valve that occurred when the motor operator torque switch failed to actuate during testing...GPUN identified two control rods that failed to fully insert during the control drop rod time testing at the beginning of 13R...GPUN provided sufficient information to ensure that the reactor building emergency coolers (RBECs) were operable [See May 13, 1999 - June 4, 1999, for a related event] , but in a degraded state, when a building spray train was taken out of service in May 1999...GPUN did not consider a single failure in their analysis of the maximum hypothetical accident off site dose calculations...Failure of technicians to adequately maintain air sampling equipment by properly inspecting and replacing O-rings in air monitors resulted in a minor violation."
September 11, 1999 - "Sixty of 61 control rods inserted...required 3/4 insertion position within the 1.66 second time requirement, while one rod did not. One control rod stopped at 26% withdrawn and it was declared inoperable. Tech Spec[s] 3.5.2.2 allows for one inoperable control rod to remain completely out of the core. One additional control rod stopped at approximately 7% withdrawn; however, this control rod did not meet Technical Specification insertion position and requirements." ( NRC, April 18, 2001.)
An LER was submitted on October 21, 1999. (See April 18, 2001, for Corrective Actions.)
(For problems relating to the reactor vessel see November 16, 1993; March 30, 1994; March 4 and October 4 & 15, 1997; February 26, 1998; September 11, 1999; October 9, 2001 & March 21, 2002.)
October 19, 1999 - A Main Steam Isolation Valve Motor Operator failure occurred during plant startup. GPUN submitted a LER on November 17, 1999. (IR 05000289/1999011).
November 16, 1999 - The NRC identified a problem with the "use of electronic pocket dosimeters (EPD). The inspector noted that this poor work practice could result in inaccurate dosimetry records and individuals not being aware of their personal dose history. For instance, no inaccurate dosimetry records were identified. The inspector was concerned that individuals within operations management were aware of this practice and did not correct it prior to the CAP [Corrective Action Process] being written." IR 05000289/99010.) (See August 8, 1998, for a related incident.)
December 20, 1999 - TMI-'s license was transferred from GPU Nuclear to AmerGen. TMI-2 remains a GPU possession in placed in Post-Defueling Monitored Storage in 1992. GPU contracts with AmerGen to maintain a skeletal staff presence at TMI-2. (See July 17, 1998 & March 31, 2000.)
December 21, 1999 - Emergency Feedwater Pump-1 was "unexpectedly started when operators cycled open the low pressure steam admission valve." (IR 05000289/1999011.)
December 27, 1999 - The NRC acceded to industry pressure to keep information about nuclear plant shutdowns and restarts "confidential" unless the licensee "waives the right." "In the past, the NRC would supply information about most aspects of nuclear licensees' affairs, but with the move toward market competition, it became evident that the policy was having an effect on wholesale prices...The NRC's Mindy Landau said, 'We have seen shutdown information directly affect the prices on the spot market for electricity.' " (The Energy Report, December 27, 1999.)
January 4, 2000 - "...Total number of tubes plugged in OTSG-A is 1,336 (8.6% of the 15,531 tubes), and the total number of plugged tubes in OTSG-B is 404 (2.6% of the 15,531 tubes)."
(AmerGen Letter, 1920-99-20679, Attachment 1, "Topical Report 135.")
(Please see February 18, 1999, for background data.)
The total number of in-service "sleeved tubes":
January 10, 2000 - AmerGen was forced to respond to a "partial loss of off site power caused when the non-safety related 'A' auxiliary transformer tripped on its fault pressure relay." (IR 05000289/1999011.)
January 10, 2000 - GPU failed to follow procedures while isolating a fire service header for maintenance. (IR 05000289/199011.)
January 24, 2000 - The 'B' makeup pump seal (MU-P-1B) was replaced and "returned to service following overhaul in the fall 1999 refueling outage. A previous shaft seal replacement in November 1999 was unsuccessful at stopping the shaft seal leakage...AmerGen successfully replaced the pump shaft mechanical seal on the 'B' makeup pump. However, efforts to repair several minor oil leaks on the pump lubricating oil system were unsuccessful. Some minor housekeeping and foreign material control deficiencies were identified after the pump was returned to service." (IR 05000289/2000-001 & 05000320/2000-01.)
January 30, 2000 - "During monthly testing of the 'B' emergency diesel generator, excessive smoke was observed coming for the engine exhaust manifolds. The smoke resulted from a combination of oil leaks and less than adequate housekeeping on the machine ['The inspector previously identified, following the last diesel generator run on January 10, 2000, several areas of standing oil and oily rags on the EDG that had not been cleaned up.'] (IR 0500289/2000-001* 05000320/2000-001.) (See November 22-25, 2002, for related problem.)
February 2, 2000 - The auxiliary building exhaust fans unexpectedly tripped during maintenance "causing an unplanned TS LCO [Limited Condition for Operation.]" (IR 05000289/2000-001 & 05000320/2000-001.)
February 2, 2000 - The "operating crew" improperly implemented a controlled draining of the borated water storage tank (BWST).
The crew used an uncontrolled document and calculated an incorrect minimum tank level to justify that the level had not gone below the TS requirements. While the BWST is a safety significant component, there was no specific safety consequence to this issue because, based on engineering review, the BWST level was never below the TS requirement level...AmerGen properly documented the review of this issue in the corrective action process (CAP)..."
(IR 05000289/2000-001 & 05000320/2000-01.)
(Please refer to May 23, 1994, December 21, 1996; and, April 25, 1997, for related incidents.)
February 10, 2000 - "For the six month period ending December 31, 1999, AmerGen reported the following Fitness for Duty data"
Of the 802 licensee employees, 264 were tested and 2 tested positive (cocaine). Of 3000 short-term contractor personnel (at both Three Mile Island and Oyster Creek), 1043 were tested and 8 tested positive (5 for marijuana, 2 for cocaine, and 1 for alcohol)...As a result of the positive drug tests, the two (2) TMI licensee employees who tested positive for cocaine as a result of Pre-Access testing were denied unescorted access to GPU operated facilities. There was one (1) contractor employee who tested positive for alcohol as a a result of For-Cause testing (observed behavior) and six (6) TMI contractor employees who tested positive for drugs as a result of Pre-Access testing. One (1) TMI contractor employee was found in possession of marijuana in the Owner Controlled Area and refused to submit For-Cause testing. The contractor employee was arrested by the Pennsylvania State Police and charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance. All eight (8) contractor employees were denied unescorted access to GPU Nuclear operated facilities.
(AmerGen letter to the NRC, February 10, 2000.)
(See July 15, 1987 and August 18, 1996, for related incidents.)
March, 2000 - "...the 1B reactor river pump strainer motor tripped on thermal overload for unknown reasons...The strainer was subsequently repaired and returned to full operational status on May 6, 2000." (IR 05000289/2000-003).
March 27, 2000 - "While performing routine calibration of the feedwater flow instruments during the week of March 27, 2000, technicians found three of the four instruments were reading lower than the acceptable band for input differential pressures at the high end of the differential pressure range..." (IR 0500289/2000-003).
March 31, 2000 - The NRC announced its of "Notice of Consideration" from AmerGen to transfer nuclear licenses' to Exelon. (See December 20, 1999.)
April 1, 2000 - The NRC "documented several examples of poor radiological work practices including: two instances involving workers reaching into potentially contaminated floor drains without proper radiological controls; spread of contamination in a clean area of a relief valve test room from an unknown source; and a worker disassembling a clogged sample line on a contaminated system without proper radiological controls. The last example resulted in the spread of contamination into a clean area and two clothing contaminations." (IR 05000289/2000-002.)
April 1, 2000 - "The May 1999 self-assessment conducted a vertical slice review and included 12 of the 60 EQW files. Sixty-five issues were identified, although the findings did not result in any equipment being inadequately qualified for its intended function. The individual issues from the self-assessment were captured by the CAP [Corrective Action Process] and/or ETTS [Engineering Task Tracking System] items.(IR 05000289/2000-002.) (See May, 1999, for background information.)
May 3, 2000 - AmerGen "identified several human performance issues during the inspection period that were entered into your corrective action process for resolution. While none of the events individually had any risk significance, the continued recurrence of these and similar low level human performance errors over the last several months is of concern and warrants your continued attention." (John Rogge, NRC, Chief, Projects Branch 7, Division of Reactor Projects.)
May 10, 2000 - "...during restoration from maintenance activities and in response to discovery that the 1 'B' NR pump discharge valve had not been closed following surveillance testing..." (0500289/2000-003).
May 12, 2000 - "...during scheduled engineered safeguards actuation systems (ESAS) functional testing, a containment isolation relay failed to actuate when required" (05000289/2000-003).
May 13, 2000 - The NRC reviewed the High Pressure Injection System which had required improvement "since February 1997 due to system unavailability and since January 1999 due to maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFF)" (05000289/2000-003).
May 18, 2000 - "...while restoring the 'A' train of the building spray system from a scheduled outage, operators inadvertently drained six inches of level from sodium hydroxide tank into the auxiliary building sump resulting in an unplanned entry into the TS limiting condition for operation (LCO)...AmerGen's failure to comply with AP 1002, while restoring the sodium hydroxide tank to service, was considered to be a minor violation of TS 6.8 not subject to formal enforcement process." (IR 05000289/2000-004).
June 9, 2000 - The NRC "approved transferring the operating license for the Oyster Creek nuclear station in New Jersey to AmerGen Energy Co." The New Jersey utilities board, which will meet on June 22, still needs to approve the transfer. ("Reuters", June 9, 2000, 3:12 pm.) (See September 11, 1997, for background information).
July 26, 2000 - On April 15, 1997, the NRC "informed GPU Nuclear "that the TMI licensing basis for pipe breaks included the postulation of a full diameter break in the letdown line between the containment penetration and the breakdown office. Therefore, the design of safety-related equipment in the affected areas should consider the environmental conditions resulting from such a break...Because of its assumptions, GPUN had not evaluated the environmental qualification (EQ) requirements of the affected equipment." This violation "is considered a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with the current Enforcement Policy, based on its very low risk significance and because it is being tracked in the licensee's corrective action program.
(NCV 05000289/2000-004-01.)"
August 8, 2000 - FirstEnergy Corporation proposed a $4.5 billion takeover and merger of GPU.
September 11, 2000 - A License Event Report was issued on April 11, 2001: AmerGen "discovered" a "condition outside the plant design basis for the small break loss of coolant accident analysis of recorded for the core flood tank line break case." (AmerGen, George H. Gellrich, Plant Manager.)
December 5, 2000 - On December 5, 2000, AmerGen recorded excessive leakage in the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leak rate. "...AmerGen's failure to follow the procedural requirements for collecting and measuring ECCS leakage is a violation..."
The NRC issued a Non-Cited Violation was issued.
(IR 05000289/2000-008.)
December 15, 2000 - The NRC reported "the failure to include two nuclear services closed cooling water system valves in the in-service testing program."
Another Non-Cited Violation was issued.
(IR 05000289/2000-010)
December 18, 2000 - The turbine driven emergency feedwater (TDEFW) pump governor oiler was marked with an equipment trouble tag (ETT). "AmerGen's failure to identify a deficiency in a TDEFW governor oiler and take corrective action such that a problem does not occur is a violation..."
Another Non-Cited Violation was issued. (IR 05000289/2000-008.)
December 19, 2000 - The NRC "reported to control room operators (CRO) that a fire door separating both safety-related barriers had a sticky latch...On December 22, 2000, the inspectors discovered the SROs [senior reactor operators] had not initiated compensatory measures for the degraded fire door. The inspectors also identified that the door was again left in an unlatched condition...AmeGen repaired the fire door on December 26, 2000."
Another Non-Cited Violation was issued.
(IR 05000289/2000-008.)
December 21, 2000 - The NRC "determined that AmeGen failed to establish sufficient controls to maintain safety-related battery room temperatures within design basis assumptions. The condition affected both station batteries."
Another Non-Cited Violation was issued.
(IR 05000289/2000-008.)
January, 2001 - A bomb threat was made at TMI.
February 1, 2001 - "...operators performed the EF-P-2A surveillance test. The pump axial vibrations exhibited an unexplained step increase that was more than two and-half times the previous recorded number and exceeded the inservice test alert range value. The condition received an inadequate operability evaluation by the shift manager." . (See February 5, 2001, for related developments and an Apparent Violation.) (IR 50-289/2001-002) (See February 5 & September 22, 2001, for a related development.)
February 5, 2001 - "An auxiliary operator found the outboard bearing oilier empty [on on the A' motor driven emergency feedwater pump] and informed the control room supervisor. ...Because EF-P-2A was not in operation at the time, the control room operator incorrectly determined pump, operability was not affected. The deficient condition was not entered into the corrective action process for resolution and no actions were taken to identify the cause of the empty oiler. (IR 50-289/2001-002).
(See See February 1 & September 22, 2001, for related developments.)
February 12, 2001 - "... the NRC inspectors found the bearing oilier on the 'A' motor driven emergency feedwater pump (EF-P-2A) empty. Subsequent investigation by your staff revealed an oil leak and vibrations on the pump shaft bearing of sufficient magnitude to cause the pump to be inoperable. Our assessment of your performance during the events leading up to this finding identified significant deficiencies in your staff's ability to identify and resolve equipment performance issues. In this case, the poor performance resulted in the EF-P-2A being inoperable for longer than the technical specification allowed outage time."
(Refer to February 5 & 12, 2001, for background. See February 14, 2001, 2001, for related developments.) (Richard V. Crlenjak, NRC, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, May 9, 2001.)
A finding of "low to moderate" safety significance ("White) was attached to this incident.
February 14, 2001 - "...AmerGen engineers identified loose bolts on the outboard bearing housing inner cover...Tightening the bolts stopped the oil leak. However, AmerGen failed to perform a post-maintenance test on the pump after tightening the bolts. AmerGen performed a pump inservice test on March 3, 2001, after questioning by the inspectors. The pump axial vibrations returned to the previous reference value. (See February 1, 2001, for background.) (IR 50-289/2001-002).
March 12, 2001 - AmerGen used an inadequate maintenance procedure to change the pump bearing on the 'A' nuclear service closed cooling water system pump."
A Non-Cited Violation with a "green cornerstone" was issued.
(IR 50-289/2001-002).
April 18, 2001 - The direct cause for the LER on September 11, 1999, "...was determined to be fuel assembly guide tube distortion, which resulted in excessive mechanical drag. Contributing factors were core location and shuffle history of the affected assemblies and hold down spring force...The two fuel assemblies where incomplete rod insertion occurred were discharged from the core. Additionally, TMI-1 redesigned the Cycle 13 core loading pattern and relaxed the pre-load forces in the hold down springs on specific fuel assemblies...It should be noted that there had been no prior instance at TMI of control rod failing to fully insert when the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) was de-energized." (AmerGen, George H. Gellrich, Plant Manager.) (See October 15, 1997, for a related incident.)
April 21, 2001 - GPU fired an engineer who worked at TMI for 20 years for possessing "computer images of children engaging in sex acts or simulated sex acts." The man faces 112 counts and was released on $50,000 bail.
April 25, 2001 - Power was reduced to 75% to "investigate an abnormal gassing condition on the "A' main transformer."(IR 50-289/2001-03).
April 25 to May 12, 2001 - TMI was operated from between 1% to 75% of power to "facilitate troubleshooting and repairs on the 'A' main transformer. (See April 29, 2001, for related developments). (IR 50-289/2001-03).
April 27, 2001 - The NRC issued a Non-Cited Violation for the following "Green" finding: "AmerGen failed to assess the increase in risk that resulted from proposed maintenance on the 'C' traveling screen and the 'A' bar rake in the intake screen house." (IR 50-289/2001-03).
April 29, 2001 - Power was reduced to 53% for an indefinite period to make repairs on the main transformer. (See May 30, 2001, for related developments.)
May 8, 2001 - The NRC issued a Non-Cited Violation for the following "Green" finding: "Chemistry supervisors did not promptly report an out-of-specification emergency diesel fuel oil storage tank sediment sample to the maintain control room and did not initiate a corrective action process (CAP) from for more than 24 hours. The timeliness for senior reactor operators' evaluating the out-of-specification result was important because both emergency diesel generators were supplied by a single diesel fuel oil storage tank."
(IR 50-289/2001-03).
May 12, 2001 - "AmerGen shut down the reactor to investigate a leaking pressurizer relief valve that developed on May 11, 2001. The leak was about 0.7 gallons per minute to the reactor coolant drain tank." (IR 50-289/2001-03).
May 14, 2001 - In testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, it was reported that TM-1 plans to order a new "vapor generator boiler" from Babcock & Wilcox by 2005. (See October 20, 2001, for background information.)
May 30, 2001 - Power was "up" to 80%, and increasing by 2% increments. AmerGen is sampling at each increment, and in the event of "unsatisfactory results", the Company may have to "ramp out" and install a new transformer. (See June 7, 2001, for related developments).
June 7, 2001 - AmerGen began replacement of the 1A main transformer with a "refurbished mobile spare", i.e. "new transformer." The Company will reduce power and disconnect from the grid, but plans to be at full power by June 14, 2001.
June 13, 2001 - Exelon Nuclear "announced its intent today to eliminate 292 Local 15 Union positions, including 138 layoffs in Exelon Nuclear and 154 at Commonwealth Edison." (Exelon, New Release, June 13, 2001.)
June 16, 2001 - AmerGen "determined that it had failed to replace rupture discs in accordance with specified guidance for repair and maintenance of self contained breathing apparatus."
The NRC declared this "issue" to be a Non-Cited Violation.
(IR 50-0289/01-016).
June 22, 2001 - After widespread public criticism, AmerGen "notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it intends to delay submitting its application seeking approval for a standardized emergency plan for Three Mile Island, Peach Bottom and Limerick." (Exelon Nuclear, Press Release, June 22, 2001.) (See August 15, 2001 and July 25, 2002, for follow-up data.)
June 30, 2001 - "...Exelon Nuclear notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it intended to file for renewal of the operating licenses for Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3...
"If approved, Unit' 2's license would be extended from 2013 to 2033 and Unit 3's from 2014 to 2034..." The License extensions were approved in the Spring, 2003.
"The total cost of obtaining the renewed licenses for Peach Bottom will be about $18 million, including the NRC review, or about $8 per kilowatt hour...Exelon Nuclear also has notified the NRC that it intends to file for license renewal[s] for its Dresden and Quad Cities Stations in Illinois." (Exelon Nuclear, Press Release, July 2, 2001.)
Exelon is also considering filing for an extension of TMI-1's license which expires in 2014.
July 17, 2001 - A Non-Cited Violation was issued by the NRC relating to Emergency Feedwater Auto Initiation testing. An operator failed to perform a "surveillance test as written. Specifically, the equipment operators did not verify that a turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump steam admission valve operated consistent with the test requirements." (IR 59-289/01-05).
August, 15, 2001 - The NRC's Office of Investigation documented criminal behavior by two of Exelon's Emergency Preparedness personnel. The NRC found that the "technicians fabricated siren testing maintenance records, performed deficient siren tests on the off site EP response sirens and intentionally installed jumper wires in the siren boxes disabling important system functions." (Wayne D. Lanning, NRC, Director of Reactor Safety.) (Refer to June 22, 2001, for background information). (Refer to June 22 and October 5-9, 2001 and January 11, March 3 and December 12, 2002, for related problems.)
August 24, 2001 - The NRC identified two Non-Cited Violations "of very low safety significance". One NCV dealt with improper "design assumptions...for cross connecting the safety related NR [Nuclear Services River Water] and non-safety related SR [Secondary River Water], on a total loss of SR." The other NCV related to an inadequate pump surveillance acceptance standards for the DH river water pumps...This issue was considered to be more than minor because the lack of proper acceptance criteria in surveillance procedure 1300-3D had a credible impact on safety." (IR 50-0289/01-010).
September 17, 2001 - TMI-Alert filed a Petition for rule making with the NRC requiring the Agency to mandate armed security guards at the entrance to all nuclear rower plants. A final decision is expected in November l, 2002. The Nuclear Energy Institute, AmerGen's "voice in Washington, "recommended" that the Petition be "denied."
September 22, 2001 - "The inspectors verified AmerGen's implementation of the maintenance rule for an emergency repair to the 'A' motor driven emergency feedwater pump, (EF-P2-A)...Emergency feedwater has the fifth highest system importance to the TMI total core damage frequency." (IR 50-0289/01-07). ( See February 1 & 5, 2001, for related incidents.)
October 2, 2001 - "The NRC discovered procedural errors during "surveillance testing of the main steam safety valves..."
A Non-Cited Violation was issued. (IR 50-0289/01-07).
October 5-9, 2001 - "Licensee sirens in Lancaster County were inoperable October 5 through October 9, 2001, due to a radio transmitter being deenergized at the county facility. The transmitter is part of the siren actuation system. This issue is unresolved pending further investigation into the lines of ownership and maintenance of the actuation system." (IR 50-289/01-07.) (See August 15, 2001, for a related problem at Peach Bottom, and refer to June 22, August 15 and January 11, March 3 and December 12, 2002, for related problems.)
October 6, 2001 - After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and a downed airliner in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, the NRC has issued a "Security Advisory", and requited 13 "prompt actions which are "safeguarded" and "classified." (See October 17, 2001, January, 2001 and March 28, 2002, for related incidents.)
October 9, 2001 - TMI was shut down for a planned 29 day refueling outage...(See December 8, 2001, for refueling costs.)
October 17, 2001 - Due to a "credible threat" against Three Mile Island, the Harrisburg and Lancaster airports were closed for four hours, air travel was restricted in a 20-mile radius, a fighter jets were scrambled around TMI. (See October 6, 2001, for a related event.)
(See October 17, January, 2001, and March 28, 2002, for related incidents.)
October 20, 2001 - AmerGen issued an LER due to the "degradation from the server of a plugged tube in the B" once through steam generator (OTSG) [AB/SG] had resulted in degrading in an adjacent in-service tube. The damage was such that the degraded tube may not have remained intact under accident conditions. Three (3) other adjacent in-service tubes were damage[d] by the severed plugged tube but would have remained intact under accident conditions...
"The corrective actions in response to the discovery of the condition were de-watering of 870 mechanically plugged tubes prior to plugging/re-plugging, the insertion of stabilizers into plugged tubes or surrounding of plugged tubes with stabilized plugged tubes." (LER No. 2001-002-0, December 14, 2001).
As of, January 4, 2000 - "...Total number of tubes plugged in OTSG-A is 1,336 (8.6% of the 15,531 tubes), and the total number of plugged tubes in OTSG-B is 404 (2.6%) of the 15,531 tubes.) "
(AmerGen Letter, 1920-99-20679, Attachment 1, "Topical Report 135.")
(Please see February 18, 1999, for background data.)
The total number of in-service "sleeved tubes":
*(For related OTSG problems, please refer to: March 29, October 7, November 22 and 29, 1985; April 18, 1986 and December 18, 1986; March 23 and 31, May 1 and September 22, 1987; March 26 to April 30, June 20 and 21, August 7 and October 30, 1988; January 10 and March 6, 8, 19 and 22, 1990; November 4-8, 1991; and, September 28, 1992; October 12, 1995; March 12, October 10, 1997 (incorrectly evaluated SGT leakage during emergency drill); and April 24, 1997; January 11, 1999; and, May 14, 2001).
November 2, 2001 - Governor Mark Schweiker reversed an earlier decision, and ordered the National Guard to Pennsylvania's nuclear power plants. The Commonwealth joins over a dozen states with National Guards and/or Coast Guard detachments deployed to protect nuclear facilities against terrorist attacks. (See October 6 & 17, 2001, for related incidents).
November 7, 2001 - Exelon met with the NRC to discuss the consolidation of Emergency Plans for TMI, Peach Bottom and Limerick. Exelon requested the plans be approved and implemented by January 2, 2002. The following personnel (17), including a "Security Coordinator" would be affected:
* LGS and PB Emergency Plan Positions Affected
1 Communicator
* TMI Emergency Plan Positions Affected
4 Technicians
(Presentation by: William Jefferson, Director, Generation Support, Exelon Nuclear, Mid Atlantic Regional Operating Group, May 16, 2001.) (See June 22, August 15, & October 1 2001, for related developments.)
November 10, 2001 - Three procedural problems were identified during reactor coolant system cool down and mid-loop operation.
A Non-Cited Violation was issued by the NRC.
(IR 50-0289/01-07).
November 10, 2001 - "In reviewing the work activities performed to replace the 'B' EFW motor driven pump outboard bearing, the inspectors identified inadequate corrective actions by AmerGen. The safety significance of this finding was very low...This finding has an actual credible impact on safety..." A Non-Cited Violation was issued. (IR 50-0289/01-07). (See February 1 & 5, 2001, for precursor incidents. Also, see September 22, 2001, for a related incident.)
December 8, 2001 - TMI resumed operation after a 58 day refueling outage that cost the company over $100 million in lost revenues, replacement energy, and planned and unplanned repairs, and upgrades. Among the "big-ticket" items: replacement of the turbine generator and four main transformers; repairs of cracks in six control-rod drive mechanisms; trouble shooting on chronic emergency feedwater problems; and, experimental steam tube generator repairs which led to the "unplugging" of 870 tubes and taking 266 tubes out-of-service.
(For problems relating to the reactor vessel see November 16, 1993; March 30, 1994; March 4 and October 4 & 15, 1997; February 26, 1998; September 11, 1999; October 9, 2001 & March 21, 2002.)
December 12, 2001 - The NRC issued a Non-Cited Violation due to "a main condenser degraded vacuum condition" and "errors that unnecessarily maintained the turbine bypass valve inoperable for an additional six-and-a-half-hours...This finding is more than minor because locking out the TBVs [turbine bypass valves] from automatic operation had an impact on safety. Automatic operation of the TBVs is considered in the safety analysis report for loss of electric power events."(IR 50-0289/01-06).
January 9, 2002 - A well-armed, disgruntled former employee at the San Onfore nuclear power plant in San Clemente was arrested for making threats against the plant. (See October, 6, 2001, January 30 & March 28 and December 10, 2002, for related incidents.)
January 11, 2002 - Siren testing at TMI encountered numerous problems: all sirens failed in York County and one siren failed in Lancaster County. AmerGen attributed to computer malfunctions. (June 22, August 15 & October 5-9, 2001 March 3 and December 12, 2002, for related problems.)
January 30, 2002 - President Bush's State of the Union Address including a warning that nuclear power plants may be targeted for a terrorist attack.(See October 6 & 17 and November 2, 2001, and January 9 & March 3 & 28, 2002 for related events.)
February 12, 2002 - The NRC found that one of the plants EFW bearing oiler had been leaking for 39 days and was empty. This malfunction rendered the equipment inoperable.
The NRC issued a "white" finding or another Non-Cited Violation.
March 3, 2002 - A siren malfunctioned in York County again. During TMI's annual test on on January 30, 2002, all 34 sirens in York County, located within ten-miles of the plant, failed to activate. (August, 15, 2001, October 5-9, 2001, and January 11 and December 12, 2002.)
March 15, 2002 - The following equipment performance problem was identified: "'A' emergency diesel generator lube oil filter gasket failure..." (IR 50-289/02-05).
March 21, 2002 - TMI and 68 other nuclear power plants (PWR) were ordered to conduct a review within fifteen days to determine if boric acid corrosion had damaged the reactor vessel. At Davis-Besse, boric acid "chewed two cavities in the more than 6-inch-thick steel reactor vessel...(March 21, 2002, Patriot News.)
March 28, 2002 - The NRC admitted that and the Three Mile Island and the 102 nuclear power plants could not withstand an impact of airplane the size of those that crashed into the Pentagon and World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. (March 28, 2002, Patriot News.)
April 2, 2002 - TMI's owners announced they were purchasing a new reactor vessel head at a cost of $13 million. The vessel head is currently under construction in Japan and will be shipped to France before being installed during the next refueling outage in the Fall, 2003.*
* Please note that the ring girder concrete pour in March 1970 cost Met-Ed/GPU $9 million to rip apart and redo during the construction of TMI-1.
(For problems relating to the reactor vessel see November 16, 1993; March 30, 1994; March 4 and October 4 & 15, 1997; February 26, 1998; September 11, 1999; and October 9, 2001.)
April 3, 2002 - "Two men and a male juvenile from Mexico face possible deportation after attempting to enter an unprotected area of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. All three remained in INS custody Wednesday"
(York Daily Record, April 4, 2002.)
(See January, 2001, October 6, 2001 & October 17, January, 9 and 30, 2002, and March 21, 2002, for related incidents.)
April 3, 2002 - The NRC convened a public meeting at TMI to discuss the plant's operating record for April 1 through December 31, 2001.
AmerGen was cited for 18 violations the NRC said posed risks rated at the lowest safety level. The plant was also cited for one infraction of 'low to moderate safety risk', the next step up the the danger ladder...that finding means TMI faces possible increased NRC oversight for the next year. Its one of the 25 reactors in the country under heightened regulation, while 73 of the nation's 103 reactors will receive only baseline inspections.
(York Dispatch, April 4, 2002.)
April 16, 2002 - The following issue was reviewed by the NRC: "[U]nanticipated reactor coolant system (RCS) letdown isolation." (IR 50-289/02-05).
Also a "Green" cornerstone event was identified regarding the inoperability of instrumentation that would have "precluded the operation of traveling screens in fast speed, which could have impacted the reliability of the screen river debris removal function." (See May 30, 2002, for a related event.)
April 19, 2002 - The following equipment performance problem was identified: "[T]urbine driven emergency feedwater pump governor control valve steam trap deficiency..." (IR 50-289/02-05).
April 19, 2002 - The NRC reduced an "Apparent Violation" to a Non-Cited Violation* relating to the failure of power supply due to a blown fuse "affecting all four safety-related static inverters that powered vital instrumentation and control circuits." (IR 50-289/02-05).
April 21, 2002 - The following degraded equipment issue was reviewed by the NRC: "Power range nuclear instrument, NI-6 discovered..." (IR 50-289/02-05).
May 15, 2002 - "A foreign intelligence service recently warned that a nuclear power plant in the Northeast could be the target of a July 4 terrorist attack...Published reports suggested that the target could be Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island, but a second US official with knowledge of the information said no specific facility had been named." (Knight Ridder, May 15, 2002.) (See January, 2001, October 6, 2001 & October 17, January, 9 and 30, 2002, and March 21, for related incidents.)
May 16, 2002 - The following equipment performance problem was identified: "'B' control building chiller control vane problems..." (IR 50-289/02-05).
May 28, 2002 - "Exelon Corp. and three other utilities [Main Yankee Atomic Power Co., Omaha Public Power District & Sacramento Municipal Utility District] lost a $2.2 billion legal challenge to the federal government's nuclear-waste cleanup plan...In 1992, Congress ordered utility companies that use government uranium-enrichment services to pay one-third of the cleanup bill. The U.S. Supreme Court said yesterday that it would not hear an appeals from the companies that argue that the assessments are unconstitutional." ("Associated Press", May 29, 2002.)
May 30, 2002 - "The emergency feedwater system was potentially impacted ...while an anomaly was investigated...The configuration of the safety-related river water systems was altered for the bi-annual clam treatment in June 2002. The inspectors verified...that operating parameters were normal." (IR 50-289/02-05). (See April 16, 2002, for a related event.)
May 31, 2002 - The public learned that the National Guard were equipped with unloaded M-16's at TMI and the four nuclear power plants in Pennsylvania.
June 1, 2002 - The following degraded equipment issue was reviewed by the NRC: "'A' emergency diesel generator high lube oil temperature alarm during surveillance testing..." (IR 50-289/02-05).
June 12, 2002 - The Bioterrorism Bill signed into law on June 12, 2002 mandates KI stockpiles out to 20 miles.
June 15, 2002 - The following degraded equipment issue was reviewed by the NRC: "'B' emergency diesel generator low lube oil level alarm during surveillance testing..." (IR 50-289/02-05).
July 25, 2002 - Exelon submitted plans to move the EOF to the NRC. The public was notified a week later by the NRC.*
* On June 22, 2001, after widespread public criticism, AmerGen "notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it intends to delay submitting its application seeking approval for a standardized emergency plan for Three Mile Island, Peach Bottom and Limerick." (Exelon Nuclear, Press Release, June 22, 2001.) (See August 15, 2001, for follow-up data.)
August 13, 2002 - "Three Mile Island and the operators of 68 other nuclear power plants were ordered to submit plans for future reactor vessel corrosion inspections within 30 days."
(For problems relating to the reactor vessel see November 16, 1993; March 30, 1994; March 4 and October 4 & 15, 1997; February 26, 1998; September 11, 1999; October 9, 2001; and, March 21 and April 2, 2002.)
August 31, 2002 - New security budget increased to $2.2 million annual or $550,300 less than John W. Rowe's base salary.
September 5, 2002 - Three Mile Island Alert filed a formal Petition for Rulemaking with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to include day-care centers and nursery schools in emergency evacuation planning. The proposed rule would affect all 103 operating nuclear plants in the United States.
September 5, 2002 - Exelon announced that it was putting its share (50%) of AmerGen up for sale. British Energy, which is bankrupt, owns the other 50% of AmerGen, and includes the following nuclear power plants: Clinton, Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island. The reported price tag is anywhere from $340 to $600 million.
(On July 17, 1998, AmerGen Energy reached an Agreement with GPU to purchase TMI-1 for $100 million. The proposed sale includes $23 million for the reactor, and $77 million, payable over five years, for the nuclear fuel. (See December 20, 1999 for follow-up information.)
September 10, 2002 - The Department of Homeland Security announced that the "yellow" warning had been increased to a heightened state of alert or an "orange" upgraded to 1:00 pm (Exelon Public Relations.)
October 25, 2002 - "Over the weekend we reduced power to 50% power to replace a gasket on the condenser. For a period of time only one cooling tower was operating. We got back to full power early Saturday..." Ralph DeSantis, AmerGen, October 28, 2002.)
November 4, 2002 - EDINBURGH, Scotland - Shareholders of failing nuclear operator British Energy PLC on Monday approved an increase in the company's borrowing limits to 1.6 billion pounds (US$2.5 billion) from 1.1 billion pounds (US$1.72 billion). [BE owns 50% of TMI in a joint venture with Exelon.]
Company executives said they weren't necessarily planning to borrow up to the full limit but that they wanted to maintain flexibility as they begin restructuring.
Sources close to British Energy said the increase in the borrowing limit was crucial because the nuclear operator had already nearly reached its borrowing limit.
The company, which generates one-fifth of Britain's electricity, has been operating with the help of a government bailout since early September when it publicly admitted that it was on the verge of insolvency.
On Sept. 9, the government granted British Energy a 410 million pound (US$642 million) loan facility to cover its cash and trading collateral obligations until the end of the month.
The loan was extended on Sept. 29 for an additional two months and the amount increased to 650 million pounds (US$1.02 billion).
Sources said the complexity of the negotiations meant the government's most recent loan was likely to be extended beyond the Nov. 29 deadline.
Privatized in 1996, British Energy has eight nuclear power stations and employs 5,200 people in the United Kingdom. Earlier this year, it reported full-year losses of nearly 500 million pounds (US$780 million).
November, 2002 - Governor Schweiker "directed the National Guard to join State Police in a joint security mission at the state's nuclear facilities." In December, the Governor extended the joint mission of the National Guard and the State Police at the Commonwealth's five nuclear generating stations until March 4, 2003. (DEP, Update, December 6, 2002.)
November 22-25, 2002 - " INADVERTENT START OF "B" EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR"
"... this event is considered to be an inadvertent actuation that was caused by an invalid signal...There was no effect on the TMl-1 plant due to the inadvertent start, beyond the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator, The "B" EDG did not initiate block loading or any other sequence of events. The "B" EDG was immediately shutdown and an event investigation was initiated. The "A" EDG remained operable throughout the event. Throughout the event, the "A" EDG was capable of providing emergency alternating current including performing the required "fast start" and block loading in response to an ESAS auto-start signal, an under voltage condition or loss of offsite power event...an event investigation has been initiated..." (See January 30, 2000, for a related incident.)
[Event Notification Report for November 25, 2002, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Operations Center, Event Reports For 11/22/2002 - 11/25/2002, Power Reactor, Event Number: 39396]
December 10, 2002 - A security challenge occurred at an Exelon nuclear power plant outside of Chicago.
"BRAIDWOOD -- A crazed Chicagoan, swearing to be an extraterrestrial alien, crashed his car through the gates of the Braidwood nuclear facility late Monday before speeding away only to be arrested for reckless driving in Wilmington minutes later.
No injuries resulted. Metta said the intruder is alleged to have penetrated the parking area by crashing through closed gates, flashing past a plant checkpoint and then doing "donuts" in the parking lot. ("The Daily Journal", Kankakee IL.)" (See October, 6, 2001, January 30 & March 28 and January 9, 2002, for related incidents.)
December 12, 2002 - Sirens malfunctioned in Cumberland and York counties . In Dauphin County, 28 sirens malfunctioned due to the "inadvertent" discharge of the "space bar" by a computer operator. (Refer to June 22, August 15 and October 5-9, 2001 and January 11, March 3 2002, for related problems.)
December 20, 2002 - Another security challenge occurred at an Exelon nuclear power plant outside of Chicago.
"BRAIDWOOD -- She was the second driver to breeze past the guard station at Braidwood's nuclear facility in the span of a week.
"But its unclear if the trespasses arrest of Wilmington's Christina Staley, Tuesday, will result in changes to the nuclear generating station's security apparatus.
"Neal Miller, station director, noted that Ms. Staley, 31, had apparently become disoriented and was looking for some place to turn around when she drove past the security at 9 a.m."
("The Daily Journal", Kankakee IL.)"
(See January 9 and December 10, 2002, for related incidents.)
January 9, 2003 - A work schedule extension was implemented by AmerGen "for the 'C' nuclear services closed cooling water pump outage concurrent with the 'B' emergency diesel generator monthly surveillance..." (IR 50-289/03-02).
January 13, 2003 - The Company detected "instrument anomalies associated with the 'A' once-through steam generator main steam line radiation monitor..."
(IR 50-289/03-02).
January 23-25, 2003 - AmerGen "identified a reactor coolant system leak source inside containment...leak rate at the time was o.1 gallons per minute. On January 25, 2003, operators isolated the direct leak path from the reactor coolant system to the fitting by shutting the RCITS [reactor coolant system inventory tracking system] isolation valves from the decay heat drop line" (50-289/03-02).
February 24, 2003 - AmerGen began "troubleshooting activities to investigate reactor coolant flow measurement anomalies in the 'A' reactor protection system (RPS) channel..." (IR 50-289/03-02)
However, two days later, AmerGen reported "instrument anomalies with the reactor coolant system flow rate input to the 'A' RPS channel..."
(See March 18, 2003, for a related development).
February 26, 2003 - The HPI injection system low flow alarm surveillance test failed (IR 50-289/03-02).
March 12, 2003 - AmerGen investigated "instrument anomalies associated with the reactor building particulate radiation detector..." (IR 50-289/03-02)
March 18, 2003 - AmerGen investigated "emergent nuclear instrumentation variations on the 'B' channel with the 'A' RPS [reactor protection system] channel bypassed..." (IR 50-289/03-02) (See February 24, 2003, for a related development).
March 22, 2003* - The NRC issued a Green Non-Cited Violation after "inspectors found AmerGen failed to adequately control the use of a temporary floor drain plug used to function as a flood barrier. The inspectors found the plug deflated and longer capable of functioning as a flood barrier. The finding is greater than minor because, in the event of a maximum probable flood, the operability of the safety-related equipment the river water pump house would have been challenged"(IR 05000289/2003003).
* Please note that AmerGen replaced 'C' nuclear river water pump on March 3, 2003.
(IR 50-289/03-02) (For more information on "River Water problems", please refer to: (March 3 and August 17, 1993; February 23, March 30, July 12 and September 16, 1994; October 9 and December 4, 1995; September 29, 1996; November 20, 1997; and, August 24, 2001.)
May 21, 2003 - "EXELON'S FORMER CHIEF EXECUTIVE MADE THE TOP 10 LIST OF BEST-PAID U.S. energy executives for 2002, according to a compilation by the Platts Energy Business & Technology (EB&T) magazine. Corbin McNeill, Jr., the ex-chairman and co-CEO of Exelon Corp. had a compensation package of nearly $29.8- million last year, making him the fourth highest paid CEO out of the 250 executives that were examined. McNeill's 2002 package included a severance payment and benefits from a pension benefit plan from PECO Energy" (Nuclear News, Platts).
Please refer to August 6, 2003, for information relating to the elimination 0f 1,900 jobs at Exelon, and July 13, 2003, for the radical decrease in school tax payments.
May 22, 2003 - THE PENNSYLVANIA NATIONAL GUARD IS INCREASING ITS PRESENCE at the state's nuclear plants, Gov. Edward Rendell (D) announced yesterday. Since shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks until the end of last month, Pennsylvania had had a 24-hour Guard presence at the plants, but then had switched to random, unannounced security patrols, Rendell spokesman Michael Lukens said. But under Rendell's order, which went into effect yesterday, the two elements are being combined, Lukens said. He said the order would remain in effect "indefinitely," and the governor's office would continue to assess it. Rendell's announcement said he took the action in response to the recent elevation of the national threat level to orange, but Lukens said the state's assessment of the need for the Guard would not necessarily be tied to future changes in that threat level. ( Platts Nuclear News Flashes.
(See October 6 & 17, 2001, January 30,May 31, and November 2, 2002 for related incidents).
June 24-25, 2003 - "An access panel cover for the Control Building Ventilation System supply duct was found to be dislodged on June 24, 2003. The access panel was immediately realigned upon discovery of the condition and secured. The probable cause of the event is that vibration of the ductwork caused the panel closure camlocks to vibrate from a closed position to an open position. A walk down is being performed to ensure that other access panels are secure. The corrective action to this event will address additional actions to ensure these closure camlocks and other similar camlocks are positively secured to prevent an event recurrence.
"The review of the potential impact of this system configuration determined on June 25, 2003 that conditions may have existed as defined in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and that the event requires reporting. On Tuesday, June 25, 2003, further Engineering evaluation determined that the dislodged panel access cover for the Control Building Ventilation System may have reduced the systems capability to maintain a positive pressure in the Control Building Habitability Envelope. This condition could have lead to increased unfiltered in-leakage of airborne radioactive material beyond the previously analyzed condition in the event of a design basis accident. Further analysis may determine that the system would have been able to perform its design basis function (US NRC, June 25, 2003).
July 13, 2003 - "Utilities save big as towns lose out: Tax bills on plants of major power companies in Pennsylvania have gone from $120 million annually to $20 million" (Anthony R. Wood, Inquirer Staff Writer),
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Dauphin County assessed the facility, scene of the nation's worst nuclear accident, at $64.9 million. AmerGen, the Exelon partner that owns it, put its worth at $5 million. While the appeal is pending, AmerGen is paying $400,000 in taxes a year, compared with $1.5 million it would have to pay under the county's assessment.
Lower Dauphin School District already has spent $75,000 in legal and appraisal fees to fight the appeal, said business manager Bill Miller.
July 23, 3003 - The NRC issued a Green Non-Cited Violation after inspectors documented "three instances in which the licensee had identified potentially disqualifying medical conditions in regard to licensed operators, but did not report these conditions to the NRC within 30 days because of a lack of understanding of the reporting requirement (See August 8, 2003, for a "relief request".) (IR 05000289/2003003).
July 30, 2003 - EXELON REPORTED SECOND QUARTER 2003 EARNINGS OF $402-MILLION, an 8.9% increase over the $369-million earned in the same quarter one year ago. The company said an increase in sales, lower interest expense, and lower depreciation and amortization offset weather-related decreases in electricity deliveries and lower energy margins at Energy Delivery. Exelon reported its nuclear fleet, excluding the plants in the AmerGen joint venture (Clinton, Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island-1) generated 29,619 gigawatt-hours in the second quarter, compared to 28,776 GWH in the second quarter of 2002. Capacity factor of the Exelon fleet, including the AmerGen plants, improved to 94% during the second quarter this year from 92.1% in the second quarter last year, Exelon reported. AmerGen is a joint venture between Exelon and British Energy (Source: Platts, Nuclear News).
Study Finds Utility Winners During Deregulation Are Companies That 'Stuck to Their Knitting'
"From 1998 to 2002, U.S. utilities leapt into deregulation and created multiple strategies to compete. Because it takes time to determine how the strategies worked, we are just seeing results now. Winners among utility companies relied on traditional regulated utility assets," said Coyne and Hartshorne. "They are firms that stuck to their knitting rather than plunging into merchant power generation or purchasing foreign power plants.
" The top five companies in annualized shareholder return were Exelon Corp., Southern Company, Entergy Corp., Western Gas Resources and PPL Corp.
"The bottom five companies in total shareholder return for the five-year period were Aquila Inc., Dynegy Inc., The Williams Companies, Inc., The AES Corp. and El Paso Corp."
August 6, 2003* - EXELON'S PLANNED JOB CUTS WILL HAVE "MINIMAL" IMPACT ON NUCLEAR operations, company spokeswoman Ann Mary Carley told Platts. Exelon announced today it would eliminate about 1,900 positions--10% of its workforce--by 2006 as part of its restructuring. Carley said most cuts will be in Exelon's information technology and communications areas. Exelon plans to cut 1,200 positions by 2004 and another 700 by 2006.
* Please note: Exelon is currently pursuing initiatives to reduce staffing levels, i.e., "Best in Fleet." Exelon wants to a implement "steady state" staffing levels, i.e., labor reductions, this year. Beginning on January 29, 2002, Exelon announced it would cut 3,400 or 15% of its work force by the end of 2002.
On February 26, 2002 - Corbin McNeill Jr. announced his retirement,
Corbin A. McNeill's base salary, after the merger increased, from $659,857 to $855,830, and his bonus was increased from $1 million to $1,081,572. In addition, McNeill's restricted stock increased from $942,188 to $2.8 million. [May 20, 2001.] "McNeill is the company's largest individual shareholder. His 1.53 million shares are worth $79.1 million based on yesterday's closing price of $51.70" (Philadelphia Inquirer, C-1, March 14, 2002.) (Please refer to May 21, 2003, for McNeill's $29 million payment.)
August 6, 2003 - the ax fell although --EXELON'S stated that their job cuts will have a "minimal" impact on nuclear operations, according company spokeswoman Ann Mary Carley. told Platts. Exelon announced today it would eliminate about 1,900 positions--10% of its workforce--by 2006 as part of its restructuring. Carley said most cuts will be in Exelon's information technology and communications areas. Exelon plans to cut 1,200 positions by 2004 and another 700 by 2006 (Source: Platts, Nuclear News).
August 8, 2003 - All but two nuclear generation stations have Petitioned the NRC for relief from an NRC Security Order issues in April, 2003. Exelon has asked for the waiver at its ten nuclear generating stations including Three Mile Island (See July 23, 2003, for a related development at TMI.)
The order had established work-hour controls to address the issue of security guard personnel becoming too fatigued to effectively do their jobs. Susquehanna and Cook were the only plants not to request any kind of exemption. Most asked NRC to consider changing its interpretation of "shift turnover time." The operators do not want that time to be calculated in the total number of hours worked. Almost all also sought a relaxation of the work-hour controls during force-on-force exercises and for related preparation activities. Garmon West of NRC's Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response said none of the plants had requested a hearing on the order. He said the staff will respond to each of the exemption requests, possibly by the end of the month (Source: Platts, Nuclear News).
* Since July 17, 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued 30 Non-Cited Violations and one "Apparent Violation" to Three Mile Island Unit-1's owners and operators: AmerGen. Based on calculations prepared by the Nuclear Energy Institute, the average cost to a company to respond to a Notice of Violation is $50,000. The NRC has saved AmerGen at least $1,550,000 by "defining" 30 Violations at as "Non-Cited Violations".
November 25, 2003 - TMIA Press Release: Three Mile Island's Refueling Outage Extended
TMI's refueling outage has been extended due to a leak near the Pressurizer Heater Bundle (PHB).
TMI-Alert chairman Eric Epstein stated, "The refueling outage was scheduled to last about 35 days. A week longer than normal, but two weeks shorter than other reactors replacing reactor vessel heads."
According to Exelon: "On November 23, 2003, a second leak was detected when "steam was observed emanating from either the seal weld of the PHB diaphragm plate."
The initial leak with the PHB was identified on, November 4, 2003: "An inspection of the Pressurizer Heater Bundle (PHB) Diaphragm Plate was completed. This Inspection identified a leak path emanating from the lower Pressurizer Heater Bundle" (Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
Note: October 9- December 8, 2001 - TMI resumed operation after a 58 day refueling outage (twice as long planned!) that cost the company over $100 million in lost revenues, replacement energy, planned and unplanned repairs, and upgrades. Among the "big-ticket" items: replacement of the turbine generator and four main transformers; repairs of cracks in six control-rod drive mechanisms; trouble- shooting on chronic emergency feed water problems; and, experimental steam tube generator repairs which led to the "unplugging" of 870 tubes and taking 266 tubes out-of-service.
Dec 3, 2003 - Report: Funds set aside for nuke cleanup inadequate, by AD CRABLE, Lancaster New Era
Congressional investigators say utilities are not adequately setting aside the hundreds of millions of dollars needed to clean up nuclear reactors at Three Mile Island and Peach Bottom when the plant sites close.
The report by the U.S. General Accounting Office claims that funds that, by law, must be set aside for restoring plant sites to their original condition may be as much as 25 percent lower than needed for TMI's Unit 2 reactor. Decommissioning for Peach Bottom's closed Unit 1 reactor appears to be 51 to 100 percent underfunded, according to the report.
The cost of closing down and removing TMI Unit 2 was estimated at $433 million in 1997. The cost of decommissioning Peach Bottom Unit 1 was recently estimated at $129 million by plant owner Exelon Nuclear. The report did not say how much actually had been set aside to date in the decommissioning funds for the two reactors.
However, the owners of the two plants, where other reactors remain in use, said today that the decommissioning funding report by the investigative arm of Congress is flawed and that the money will be there when the plant sites end their useful life several decades from now.
Updating a 1999 report that first warned that decommissioning funding at many U.S. nuclear plants was not adequate, the GAO said on Monday that the $27 billion saved by the nuclear industry through 2000 was actually ahead of schedule.
But breaking down the savings by individual plant owners, the study said that owners of 42 of the 125 nuclear plants that have operated in the United States had accumulated fewer funds than needed to be on track to pay for eventual decommissioning, after the plants close.
"Under our most likely assumptions, these owners will have to increase the rates at which they accumulate funds to meet their future decommissioning obligations," the 55-page report said. Furthermore, the report criticized the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- the nuclear industry's governmental watchdog -- for not taking action to force utilities to step up funding to address inadequacies.
In 1988, the NRC began requiring owners to certify that sufficient money would be available when needed to decommission their nuclear plants. Beginning in 1998, utilities were required every two years to show how much money had been set aside and where the money was coming from. Most funds come from ratepayers and investments in trust funds.
The GAO study singled out Exelon Nuclear, the owner of Peach Bottom and the active reactor at TMI, as being behind the curve on set-aside funding. GAO said the trust funds for 11 of the 20 nuclear power plants owned by the company were inadequate.
However, the GAO found that Exelon Nuclear was actually well above other utilities in saving for the future closure of TMI's active Unit 1 reactor and Peach Bottom's two active reactors. And Exelon spokesman Craig Nesbit said the more-than-adequate funding will take care of any deficiency for the other Peach Bottom reactor that closed in 1974. Nesbit criticized the GAO report, saying it looked only at individual units instead of entire plant sites, and did not consider specific decommissioning strategies, such as Exelon's.
He also said the GAO study was "skewed" because it did not take into account that most nuclear plants, such as Peach Bottom and TMI, will be relicensed for another 20 years, which gives utilities more time to save decommissioning funds. "All of Exelon's plants are adequately funded for decommissioning now, and will be in the future," Nesbit said.
Though Exelon owns the site, the responsibility for decommissioning the TMI Unit 2 reactor, closed since a 1979 accident, lies with FirstEnergy Corp., which bought out former TMI owner GPU.
The GAO study indicated the funding shortage is between 1 percent and 25 percent for TMI's Unit 2. FirstEnergy spokesman Scott Shields denied today that there were inadequate funds for restoring the Unit 2 site to its original condition.
"We will continue to collect funds for the decommissioning for Unit 2 and we will be fully funded by the time the plant is retired," he said. Shields noted the site can't be cleaned up until Unit 1 is closed. TMI's license expires in 2014 but an extension is expected.
Eric Epstein, an expert witness on decommissioning before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and chairman of TMI-Alert, a safe-energy citizens group, is not so confident.
He said the GAO study on decommissioning shortcomings is just the tip of the iceberg. Citing the escalating costs of disposing of low-level and high-level nuclear waste, Epstein said "clearly the utilities underestimate and lowball decommissioning costs." Epstein fears utilities will not be making the profits in the future when plants are closed down and will not be able to pay for what it will actually cost to restore nuclear plant sites. People not yet born may have to pay for that shortcoming through higher electric bills, he said.
Inadequate funding for future closures was a constant concern expressed by former Lancaster mayor Art Morris when he chaired a citizens advisory panel on the cleanup of TMI in the 1980s.
"It's just the same old story. It's absolutely remarkable that after all these years of public comment and criticism that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission just sits and does nothing about (inadequate funding)," Morris said today. "The taxpayers will have to pay for it. There needs to be an NRC that stays on top of this and monitors it."
December 2003 - Since July 17, 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued 31 Non-Cited Violations and one "Apparent Violation" to Three Mile Island Unit-1's owners and operators: AmerGen. Based on calculations prepared by the Nuclear Energy Institute, the average cost to a company to respond to a Notice of Violation is $50,000. The NRC has saved AmerGen at least $1,705,000 by "defining" 31 Violations at as "Non-Cited Violations".
December 22, 2003 - NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS BEGAN PROTECTING PENNSYLVANIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS at 7 a.m. local time today, according to Gov. Edward Rendell (D). Troops will remain at the plants as long as the threat level remains at "orange," indicating a high risk of a terrorist incident, Rendell said. Deployment of the state National Guard to the nuclear plants was among the steps the state government took to protect Pennsylvania infrastructure in response to the raising of the Homeland Security Threat Level yesterday. The nuclear plants in Pennsylvania are Beaver Valley, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Susquehanna and Three Mile Island. NRC spokesman Dave McIntyre said he was not aware of other states deploying National Guard troops to nuclear plants in response to the increased threat level (NUCLEAR NEWS FLASHES.)
December 23, 2003 - BRITISH ENERGY COMPLETED THE SALE OF ITS 50% AMERGEN INTEREST TO EXELON GENERATION shortly after receiving shareholder approval of the deal yesterday. Exelon was British Energy's (BE) partner in the AmerGen joint venture that bought three U.S. nuclear plants--Clinton, Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island-1. As expected, BE received about (U.S.)$277-million prior to various adjustments. BE said it will pay a break fee of $8.29-million to FPL Group, following termination of the original sale agreement between BE and FPL after Exelon exercised its right of first refusal and matched FPL's offer to become the sole owner of the AmerGen plants (Platts Nuclear News).
December 30, 2003 - THREE MILE ISLAND-1's REACTOR VESSEL HEAD BEGAN ITS TRIP TO MEMPHIS, Tenn. yesterday to be cleaned and decontaminated, Exelon spokesman Dave Simon told Platts today. The cleaning and decontamination work will be done by Radiological Assistance, Consulting & Engineering (RACE) LLC. The 90-ton head, which was replaced during the unit's fall outage, is being transported by truck, Simon said. The parts of the vessel head that can be decontaminated will be disposed of in a landfill, and any parts with radioactivity will be shipped to Envirocare's low-level radwaste disposalfacility in Utah, he said (Platts Nuclear News).
(For related problems please refer to March 30, 1994 for Notice of Violation. November 16, 1993; March 4 and October 4 & 15, 1997; February 26, 1998; September 11, 1999; October 9, 2001 & March 21, 2002.)
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
A = 248 B = 253.
2001
A = 248 B = 253.*
2 Dedicated Maintenance Technicians
1 Dose Assessor
2 Dedicated Off-Site Survey member
1 On-Site OSC Coordinator
1 Dose Assessor
1 Off-Site Field Team Member
1 Communicator
1 Security Coordinator
2 Auxiliary Operators
2002
2003
Monday August 4, 2003