Lost and Stolen Nuclear Materials in the United States

A shipment of used stainless steel turbine diaphragms was being transported from the Montecello nuclear plant located near Minneapolis, MN, to Alleron in Koppel, Pa. the door of one of two 20-foot long c-vans containing these diaphragms was found to be open in the Conrail rail yard in Allentown, Pa. the c-van containers were located on a rail car, and they each contained approximately 40,000 pounds of used stainless steel turbine diaphragms with low level surface contamination (several thousand dpm/100 cm^2 smearable, or approximately 1 mrem/hr) (class-7 2913-placard material). The highest dose rate on contact with the c-van was 0.8 mrem/hr. each diaphragm was wrapped in plastic, and there was no obvious damage to the wrapping. a licensee representative stated that there was no exposure danger if the plastic wrapping was not breached. The right door (looking from the rear) was found to be open approximately 3 feet, and the wood locking and bracing was visible inside the container near the door. There were no parts found outside of the container, and the door was believed to have opened due to shifting of the contents against the door at the Allentown rail yard. A Montecello representative stated that the event was identified at approximately 1630 CST.

There is some confusion regarding the shipping papers and how the rail car in question arrived in Allentown, Pa. The Pa. Department of Environmental Protection reported that shipment entered the Conrail system on January 19, 1997, and was mistakenly transported to the Maher terminal located in dockside, NJ. the error was discovered, and the shipment was forwarded to Koppel, Pa. However, the information in the Conrail computer indicated that the rail car had been emptied, even though it had never been unloaded.

The rail car has been isolated. Conrail currently has a hazardous materials representative onsite and has contracted react to ensure that the load will be adequately secured prior to any further shipment. The Pa. Department of Environmental Protection has notified the Pa. Emergency Management Agency and has dispatched a representative to the site. A radiation protection supervisor from Montecello has also been dispatched to the rail yard and is expected to arrive tomorrow morning. in addition, Montecello requested Limerick (located near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) to send a health physics representative to the rail yard to help assess the status. The Limerick representative is expected to arrive at the rail yard by 2230 tonight and plans to report the status of the shipment to Montecello. Montecello plans to inform the NRC of this status when the report from limerick has been received.

The North Carolina division of radiation control was notified by the nuclear regulatory commission that a store in Fayetteville, North Carolina was selling tritium lighting devices.

Further investigation by the NC division of radiation control disclosed that an army surplus store was selling tritium lighting devices (torches, personnel illuminators, and map readers) to military personnel as instructed wrongfully by another company which has an NRC license.

On 1/05/89, that company distributed 30 devices (40 sources) and on 05/07/91 they distributed another 24 devices (24 sources). The two shipments totaled 64 sources of tritium measuring 136.9 curies. The store had only 22 sources remaining in stock (46.65 curies of tritium) and they have been shipped back to the licensee. The other 42 sources (90.35 curies) were sold without any records being made of the sale. The state has not yet determined what type of action it will take.

February 27, 1996 -- The three individuals who stole the cameras stripped the cameras of their caution radiation labels and took the cameras to a scrap metal dealer (A) where they were sold as scrap. The dealer sold the small Co-60 camera to a second dealer (B) the same day.

February 28, 1996 Dealer A sold the large Co-60 camera to Dealer B. The Ir-192 camera remained at Dealer A. Dealer B determined the cameras were not stainless steel.

February 29, 1996 -- Dealer B shipped both Co-60 cameras to a third scrap dealer (C) in a large load of scrap. Dealer C has radiation detectors at their plant entry and detected the radiation from the cameras. The manager of dealer C and his two assistants were not at the site when the cameras arrived. A trainee was on duty when the cameras arrived. They segregated the cameras from the rest of the scrap shipment and returned the cameras to dealer B informing them that the cameras contained radioactive materials.

The large camera's lock box, holding the pigtail and the 35.3 curie Co-60 source, was torn loose by a forklift as it was being loaded onto a pallet for loading onto a truck at dealer B for return to dealer A on the afternoon of the 29th. The lockbox, with pigtail and source, was loaded on to the pallet with one of the forks of the forklift. The exposed radioactive source and lock box remained on the pallet with the cameras.

Dealer B attempted to return the cameras to dealer A on the afternoon of February 29th, but the site had closed for the day. The manager of dealer A showed up and the dealer B driver informed him that the cameras were radioactive and that dealer B was returning the cameras. The dealer B driver returned to his facility and parked the truck containing the cameras and the exposed source in a remote area of the scrap yard.

March 1, 1996 -- Dealer B returned the cameras to dealer A. While unloading the cameras from the truck, the lock box and source fell through the pallet and remained on the truck. It was then picked up by the driver, at the source capsule, and thrown to the side after the cameras were unloaded. It was then kicked under the corner of the office building located at dealer A. by an employee. Neither individual was aware that what they were handling and kicking around was an unshielded source.

The owner of dealer A was told that the cameras were radioactive. He then sold the large camera, without the source inside, to another scrap yard (D) and sold the small camera, with the source inside and shielded, to a fifth scrap dealer (E) without advising anyone that the cameras contained radioactive materials. Dealer E in turn sold the small camera to another recycling Co. (F). The manager was unaware that the Co-60 source was on the ground at his scrap yard. The BRC was never notified by any of these companies that they were in possession of radioactive sources.

March 5, 1996 -- The 1.3 TBq (35.3 Ci) Co-60 source remained unshielded at dealer A until March 5, 1996, where it was located by BRC Health Physicists at 1:30 pm. The scrap yard was evacuated and secured and the source was recovered and secured later that evening. Eleven adults and two children were exposed to high levels of radiation at the scrap yard and one adult from dealer B was exposed when he transported and handled the camera and source. Five Houston Police Officers were exposed to low radiation levels when they conducted interviews at dealer A. Dose assessment of the incident are included in Table H.1.

DOSE ASSESSMENTS OF THE INCIDENT

Scrap Yard Owner 18 rem
Scrap Yard Manager 53 rem
Scrap Yard Manager's Wife 55 rem
Two Children at Scrap Yard 39 rem
Workers at Scrap Yard 15 rem
Customers at Scrap Yard 0.16 rem
A Scrap Yard Worker -- wholebody .5 rem -- extremity 2500/3000 rem
Police Officers .5 rem

In this case, BRC was notified by the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission, which was working at the site of the bankrupt company, that the door from the building where the devices were stored was removed. Upon investigation, BRC determined that the three devices had been removed. On March 4, 1996, BRC issued a news release that was highly publicized by the local media. This assisted in BRC eventually locating the devices.

Another incident in Illinois was discovered when a scrap dealer purchased a radiation detection instrument and found a radioactive source buried on the site. The source was discovered in backfill used to re-grade the site. Excavation of the area by an incident response team recovered the source. It was determined to be cesium-137 with an activity of approximately 370 mCi). Exposure rates were calculated to be 145 mrem/hr at 0.91 m (3 ft). There is no way of knowing how long the source had been on the site or whether it may have been exposing workers and other individuals prior to being discovered. The two incidents described above illustrate the mechanisms and potential harm that could occur to scrap workers and other members of the public. These sources could have caused serious exposure if located near individuals.