



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD, SUITE 102
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415

November 21, 2024

Jeff Richardson
President
TMI-2 Solutions, LLC and Energy Solutions, LLC
121 West Trade Street
Charlotte, NC 28202

SUBJECT: TMI-2 SOLUTIONS, LLC, THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION,
UNIT 2 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000320/2024003

Dear Jeff Richardson:

On September 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection under Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2561, "Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program," at the permanently shutdown Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2).

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, and plant walk-downs. The results of the inspection were discussed with Paul Ross, Project Director, and other members of your staff on October 24, 2024, and are described in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, two violations of NRC requirements with no or relatively inappreciable (very low) safety consequence (Severity Level IV) are documented in this report. Because of their very low safety significance and because the issues were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the violations as Non-Cited Violations (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the subject or severity of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-001.

In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To the extent possible, your response, if any, should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Current NRC regulations and guidance are included on the NRC's website at www.nrc.gov; select **Radioactive Waste; Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities**; then **Regulations, Guidance and Communications**. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's website at www.nrc.gov; select **About NRC, Organizations & Functions; Office of Enforcement; Enforcement documents**; then **Enforcement Policy** (Under 'Related Information'). You may also obtain these documents by contacting the Government Printing Office (GPO) toll-free at 1-866-512-1800. The GPO is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. EST, Monday through Friday (except Federal holidays).

No reply to this letter is required. Please contact Harry Anagnostopoulos of my staff at 610-337-5322, if you have any questions regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

Elise Eve, Team Leader
Decommissioning Team
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health
Physics Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Docket No.: 05000320

License No.: DPR-73

Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000320/2024003

cc w/ encl: Distribution via ListServ

SUBJECT: TMI-2 SOLUTIONS, LLC, THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 -
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000320/2024003

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 1

INSPECTION REPORT

Docket No.: 05000320

License No.: DPR-73

Licensee: TMI-2 Solutions, LLC (TMI-2S)

Facility: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)

Location: Middletown, PA 17057

Inspection Dates: July 1, 2024, to September 30, 2024

Inspectors: H. Anagnostopoulos, CHP, Senior Health Physicist
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security

J. Tiff, Senior Reactor Inspector
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Approved By: E. Eve, Team Leader
Decommissioning Team
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TMI-2 Solutions, LLC (TMI-2S)
Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2)
NRC Inspection Report No. 05000320/2024003

A routine announced decommissioning inspection was completed at the permanently shutdown TMI-2 on September 30, 2024. On-site inspection activities were performed on September 19 and September 23 – 26, 2024. The inspection included a review of fire protection, decommissioning project performance and status, radiation protection work planning and control, and solid radioactive waste management and transportation. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, and plant walk-downs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) program for overseeing the safe operation of a shutdown nuclear power reactor is described in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2561, "Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program."

List of Violations

One severity level IV (SL IV) non-cited violation (NCV) of TMI-2 Technical Specifications (TS) Section 6.15.5 is documented for TMI-2S' failure to control fire hazards in the Containment Air Control Envelope (CACE) building through the use of a transient combustible permit. Specifically, the CACE building was a Transient Combustibles Free Zone (TCFZ) and any combustible materials present in the building were to be controlled through the issuance of a permit. NRC inspectors identified that a diesel-powered excavator was used and stored in the CACE building and no permit was issued.

One severity level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e) is documented for TMI-2S' failure to update the Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) such that the DSAR "contains the latest information developed" for the facility. Specifically, fire dampers were installed in the CACE building and the TMI-2S fire protection program evaluation and the pre-fire plans were not updated to include this fire protection feature. The fire protection program evaluation describes how the DSAR requirements for fire protection are satisfied.

1.0 Background

In December 1993, TMI-2 received a possession-only license from the NRC to enter Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS). On December 18, 2020, the license for TMI-2 was transferred from GPU Nuclear, Inc. to TMI-2 Solutions (TMI-2S) (ADAMS No. ML20352A381). On March 31, 2023, an amended license was issued removing TMI-2 from PDMS and allowing them to begin decommissioning activities (ADAMS No. ML23051A042). TMI-2 was inspected under the “Actively Decommissioning (DECON), Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool” Category as described in IMC 2561 during this inspection period.

2.0 Active Decommissioning Performance and Status Review

a. Inspection Scope [Inspection Procedures (IPs) 64704, 71801, 83750 and 86750]

IP 64704

The inspectors reviewed documents and interviewed plant personnel to assess the effectiveness of TMI-2’s decommissioning fire protection program and to determine if it was maintained and implemented in a manner which addresses the potential for fires that could result in the release or spread of radioactive materials.

The inspectors selected fire areas and conducted inspections to ensure that NRC requirements were being met, including a review of physical fire protection features, physical plant configuration, accuracy of pre-fire plans, and a confirmation that fire hazards have been identified and controlled in each area. The inspectors toured fire zones RB-FZ-4, RB-FZ-5, and inspected RB-FZ-1 via a remote monitoring video feed. The inspectors validated that administrative controls were in place for the use and storage of combustible materials in a manner that minimizes the occurrence of fire in these areas.

The inspectors reviewed the TMI-2S fire protection program plan, and its associated fire protection program evaluation as required and as described in 10 CFR 50.48(f)(2). The inspectors reviewed the fire protection implementing procedures.

The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the Protectowire linear heat detection system to establish if it was effectively maintained that surveillances were performed, and that it was capable of performing its intended function.

The inspectors accompanied the TMI-2S Fire Marshall during their conduct of routine weekly inspections and surveillances.

The inspectors observed hot work in the turbine building’s southwest fabrication area (permit TMI2-SH-HWP-2024-0102) to determine if work was being done in accordance with the applicable fire protection program implementing procedures.

The inspectors interviewed plant personnel to understand the implementation of the fire protection program, and their response to alarms and fire events if they were to occur.

The inspectors noted that TMI-2S had fully transitioned to the “incipient fire brigade” mode of fire response and confirmed that appropriate agreements were in force for an offsite fire agency response, if needed.

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of a fire protection program surveillance TMI2-QA-SUR-2024-0018, which was completed by TMI-2S on September 20, 2024, in preparation for the NRC inspection. The inspectors evaluated the apparent cause analysis ACA-CR-2024-055105750586 that is associated with condition reports CR-2024-0551, 0575, and 0586. The inspectors reviewed a “fire protection program white paper,” TMI2-EN-RPT-FP-00-0007 dated July 30, 2024.

The inspectors evaluated whether TMI-2S was identifying problems related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and was entering them into the corrective action program.

IP 71801

Significant decommissioning activities that were conducted by TMI-2S during the inspection period included:

1. Filling the reactor vessel with water to a level just below the hot leg penetrations
2. Removal of shielding plates in the reactor cavity which were positioned over the shielded work platform
3. Inventory and radiological survey of the defueling equipment carousel located under the shielded work platform. This included photographs and video recording of the areas
4. Removal of a reactor building air cooler internal cooling coil, which exhibited high dose rates and contamination levels
5. Placement of concrete for the construction of a decommissioning support building (DSB) adjacent to the CACE building
6. Continued rubblization of concrete around the reactor building equipment hatch (to enlarge the opening)

The inspectors attended a briefing conducted by TMI-2S to provide the latest information regarding known conditions under the shielded work platform in the reactor cavity. Several covers for the work platform had been temporarily removed to allow radiation protection personnel to perform radiological surveys and a video inspection of the carousel under the platform, of the upper reactor vessel internals, and the hot legs, which exit the reactor vessel. This briefing was necessary for the inspectors to validate existing assumptions regarding nuclear criticality calculations and to plan NRC inspection efforts.

The inspectors attended a pre-job work briefing for the removal of internal cooling coils from the reactor building air cooler units, and then observed the work via audio and visual surveillance of the work site. The inspectors observed work to remove interferences and unnecessary historical equipment from the carousel under the shielded work platform, via audio and visual surveillance.

IP 83750

The inspectors reviewed radiation protection planning documents for the removal of the cooling coils from the reactor building air cooler units. This included the radiological work

permit, ALARA planning documents, and radiological risk estimation worksheets. The inspectors reviewed the existing radiological survey results for the air coolers, including radiation levels, contamination levels, and general air sample results.

IP 86750

The inspectors conducted a walk-down of the turbine building to determine whether radioactive materials were controlled, labelled, posted, and secured against unauthorized removal. During this walk-down, the inspectors evaluated the material condition of the containers.

The inspectors interviewed TMI-2S personnel and reviewed plans for the temporary storage of project-related waters and the flow-paths for moving and processing that water. The inspectors toured the spent fuel pool area to assess the material condition and suitability for its future use in water storage. The inspectors performed a review of the TMI-2S Radioactive Waste Process Control Plan, TMI2-WM1-PN-005, Revision 0.

The inspectors reviewed selected condition reports related to radioactive material transportation and radioactive waste processing.

b. Observations and Findings

IP 64704

During the tours of selected fire areas in the reactor building, the inspectors determined that requirements for transient combustible materials and the control of hot work were being met. The inspectors noted that there were several opportunities to remove unnecessary combustible materials, which were not needed to support current work activities.

Following tours of the selected fire areas and a review of fire engineering documents, the inspectors observed that the baseline combustible load of each fire area is a legacy estimate without an associated TMI-2S calculation. The inspectors noted that although not required by regulation or procedure, the lack of calculation and documentation of the assumed baseline load made it challenging to distinguish between permanent materials and transient combustibles in a fire area. This impacts the ability to determine that all combustible materials have been accounted for in a fire area.

The inspectors found that Transient Combustible Free Zones (TCFZ) were not used effectively in some instances. The TMI-2S fire protection program does not describe the intended extent or boundaries for an established TCFZ. As a consequence, the inspectors found one TCFZ (reactor building west stairwell) with notable amounts of transient combustible materials stored in close proximity to the stairwell. Without clear delineation of the expected boundaries for a TCFZ, workers cannot make informed choices about where combustibles may acceptably be placed.

The inspectors determined that the apparent cause analysis ACA-CR-2024-055105750586, which was conducted as a result of an NRC inspection in the second quarter of 2024, was thorough, comprehensive, was conducted with significant management oversight and attention, and specified appropriate corrective actions.

The inspectors noted that the fire protection program surveillance TMI2-QA-SUR-2024-0018, which was completed by TMI-2S in preparation for this NRC inspection was also comprehensive, included independent viewpoints, involved industry fire protection experts, and identified additional concerns for which TMI-2S took immediate corrective actions.

During a previous on-site inspection in June of 2024, the inspectors identified concerns with the TMI-2S fire protection program and scheduled additional inspection with the assistance of NRC staff who have fire protection expertise. An open item was initiated to track the NRC's continued review of TMI-2's fire protection program (05000320/2024002-01, *Continued Review of TMI-2's Fire Protection Program*). This inspection resolved and dispositioned the concerns, completed the fire protection inspection effort, and the open item is closed.

Violation

NRC-Identified Violation of Technical Specifications for Failure to Control Fire Hazards with a Transient Combustible Permit

On June 25, 2024, NRC inspectors entered the Containment Air Control Envelope (CACE) building as part of a routine tour and observed that a large diesel-powered excavator was located inside the building. The excavator was equipped with a hydraulic hammer and was being used to remove concrete around the reactor building's equipment hatch.

The entire CACE building was classified as a Transient Combustible Free Zone (TCFZ) as shown in Attachment 5.6 of procedure TMI2-FP-RP-015 "TMI-2 Control of Transient Combustible Material," Revision 1. A TCFZ is an area where transient combustible material is strictly controlled to manage fire risk. Transient combustible materials are not permitted in these areas without a transient combustibles permit.

The inspectors noted that the excavator contained both diesel fuel and hydraulic oil and that these materials were combustible and, therefore, a transient combustible permit was required as specified in steps 3.1.17 and 4.4.1.A of TMI2-FP-RP-015. The inspectors contacted the TMI-2S Fire Marshal to obtain a copy of the permit for the excavator and discovered that no permit had been initiated for the excavator.

On June 26, 2024, TMI-2S removed the excavator from the CACE building. On July 1, 2024, TMI-2S generated a transient combustible permit for the excavator when inside of the CACE building and wrote condition report CR-2024-0575 to document the non-compliance with TMI2-FP-RP-015. In addition, management tours were completed that identified additional materials for which transient combustible permits were required and were subsequently generated.

As part of the condition report, TMI-2S conducted an apparent cause analysis of the fire protection deficiencies, which was completed on July 23, 2024. The identified causes included failure of management to provide adequate oversight of the program, a lack of training for all project personnel, and inadequate training content.

Decommissioning Technical Specification (TS) 6.15.5 requires that TMI-2S “Establish Source Term Limitations and Administrative Controls for activities involving the removal and handling of combustible radioactive material to ensure the criteria for Notification of an Unusual Event emergency classification of two times the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual dose limits will not be exceeded in the event of a postulated fire.”

Procedure TMI2-FP-RP-015 was written as part of a program to achieve objectives of TS 6.15.5. The purpose of the procedure is to “provide governance for the control of combustible and flammable materials at Three Mile Island Unit 2” for areas that are “within the immediate vicinity of buildings with significant radioactive material (Reactor Building...).” The CACE building shares a common wall with the reactor building and its function is to provide a barrier to contain radioactive contamination when the reactor building’s equipment hatch is open. TMI-2S designated the CACE building as a transient combustible free zone (TCFZ) in order to manage the risks associated with a fire in this structure.

Procedure TMI2-FP-PR-015, “Control of Transient Combustible Material,” Revision 2, step 3.3.1 states:

“Transient combustibles cannot be staged/stored in a TCFZ unless authorized by a TCP [transient combustible permit].”

The CACE building contained radioactive material, was designated as a TCFZ, and no TCP was written for the excavator, which was present in the CACE building between May 16, 2024, and June 26, 2024.

The inspectors assessed the significance of the violation to be a severity level IV (SL IV) using section 6.3.d.3 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated August 23, 2024, regarding the licensee’s failure to implement procedures. This is a violation that is less serious but of more than minor concern and resulted in no safety consequences. This is because the CACE building was continuously occupied during operations of the excavator, portable fire extinguishers were present, and the building was under regular surveillance via video cameras.

Procedure TMI2-FP-RP-015 step 4.4.1.A required that a transient combustible permit be written to control fire hazards when combustible materials are needed in a TCFZ. Contrary to this requirement, between May 16, 2024, and June 26, 2024, an excavator was present in the CACE building’s TCFZ without authorization via a permit. Failure to generate a permit was a violation of TS.

Because TMI-2S placed the deficiency into its CAP and the violation was not willful or repetitive, the violation can be treated as a SL IV non-cited violation consistent with section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000293/2024003-01). TMI-2S entered the violation in their CAP as CR-2024-1025.

Violation

NRC-identified Failure to Describe Fire Dampers in the Fire Protection Program Evaluation and Fire Pre-Plans

During routine inspection of the fire protection program at TMI-2, the NRC inspectors reviewed a surveillance report TMI2-QA-SUR-2024-0018, "Fire Protection Program," Revision 1, dated August 12, 2024. The surveillance was initiated by TMI-2S as an independent evaluation of the TMI-2 fire protection program and basis documents by fire protection engineering consultants. The surveillance identified five findings. Finding number 5 stated that the "CACE [building] fire dampers [are] lacking NFPA 80, *Standard for Fire Doors and Other Opening Protectives*, inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) requirements for fire dampers."

The Containment Air Control Envelope (CACE) building is "a steel structure around the exterior of the Reactor Building (RB) equipment hatch opening on the west side of the RB at the 305' elevation." The CACE building provides a barrier between the RB atmosphere and the environment. This building is equipped with a metal wall and a roll-up door which separates the RB equipment hatch from the CACE building's interior. That inner metal wall is equipped with four fire dampers. These dampers were installed in June of 2023. The CACE building is designated as a Transient Combustibles Free Zone when radioactive material is present in the building.

The TMI-2S surveillance identified that these CACE building fire dampers were not selected for routine inspection, testing, and maintenance in any fire protection procedure, surveillance, or work package. Such routine inspection is required by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard number 80. The finding was entered into the TMI-2S corrective action program as CR-2024-0717.

During a review of the finding, on September 26, 2024, NRC inspectors identified that TMI-2S had also failed to include a description of these fire dampers in TMI2-FP-EVA-0001, "Fire Protection Program Evaluation," Revision 2. The inspectors further reviewed the "TMI Unit 2 Pre-Fire Plans," May 3, 2023, edition, for fire zone RB-FZ-5 (CACE building) and noted that both the written description and the zone diagram did not identify the four fire dampers. The identification of the dampers in the pre-fire plans is required by procedure TMI2-FP-PR-005, "TMI-2 Pre-Fire Plans," Revision 1, section 4.3.4.H.2. and serves "to aid and assist station or off-site fire-fighting personnel during a fire event" and "provide useful information for quickly determining emergency response strategies based on hazards and equipment in the area."

10 CFR 50.71 "Maintenance of records, making of reports," item (e) states (in part):

"Each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor under the provisions of § 50.21 or § 50.22...shall update periodically, as provided in paragraphs (e) (3) and (4) of this section, the final safety analysis report (FSAR) originally submitted as part of the application for the license, to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed."

"The TMI-2 Defueled Safety Analysis Report," TMI2-RA-LBD-2023-0003, Revision 0 fulfills the function of the FSAR for a reactor in decommissioning and is referred to as the DSAR.

Section 7.3.2 “Fire Protection, Service, and Suppression” of the DSAR states (in part) that:

“The TMI-2 Fire Protection Program meets the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.191, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning and Permanent Shutdown”

And

“The FPPE [Fire Protection Program Evaluation] describes how the program satisfies these requirements.”

Regulatory Guide 1.191, “Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Plants During Decommissioning,” Revision 1, section 4.2.2 “Fire Barrier Requirements” states (in part) that:

“Openings in a fire barrier should be sealed by the installation of fire dampers, fire door assemblies, fire window assemblies, fire-rated penetration seals, and special floor drains.”

And

“The fire hazards analysis should identify and justify any unprotected openings in a fire barrier.”

The metal wall between the CACE building interior and the RB equipment hatch served as a fire barrier and was equipped with fire dampers. The TMI-2 fire hazards analysis did not identify these fire dampers as specified in RG 1.191 and in procedure TMI2-FP-PR-005, “TMI-2 Pre-Fire Plans.” As a result, the DSAR did not include the latest information developed for the facility as required in 10 CFR 50.71(e). Had the inspectors not identified TMI-2’s failure to describe the fire dampers in key program documents, information for quickly determining emergency response strategies would not have been made available to fire-fighting personnel.

Section 1.2.6.D of the NRC Enforcement Manual specifies that if a violation does not fit an example in the Enforcement Policy violation examples, it should be assigned a severity level: (1) commensurate with its safety significance; and (2) informed by similar violations addressed in the violation examples. The issue was not found to match any of the Enforcement Policy violation examples.

The issue was determined to be of SL IV significance, which is a violation that is less serious but of more than minor concern and resulted in no safety consequences. The failure to include the four CACE building fire dampers in the FPPE is more-than minor because the CACE building is a transient combustible free zone and forms a barrier between the radioactivity in the reactor building and the environment. With the RB equipment hatch disabled (open permanently), the combination of the CACE building roll up door and the fire dampers are needed to prevent the spread of radioactivity in the event of a fire in the RB. In addition, air flows from the CACE building into the RB and the fire dampers are needed to limit the spread of any fire from the CACE building and into the RB. This failure also affected the ability of the NRC to inspect a key feature of

the CACE building's fire protection design, as this design feature was not identified in required documents.

The TMI-2 DSAR states that the fire protection program meets the requirements of RG 1.191 and that these requirements are described in the FPPE. Failure to include the four CACE building fire dampers in the FPPE is contrary to RG 1.191, constitutes a failure to ensure that the DSAR contains the latest information regarding the facility's design, and is therefore a violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e).

Because TMI-2S placed the deficiency into its CAP and the violation was not willful or repetitive, the violation can be treated as a SL IV non-cited violation consistent with section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000293/2024003-02). TMI-2S entered the violation in their CAP as CR-2024-1026.

IP 86750

The inspectors noted that plant modifications for decommissioning project water transfer and processing were still in-progress, and that little-to-no transportation of significant classifications or quantities of radioactive material had yet occurred for the project.

c. Conclusions

Two SL IV violations were documented, and one Open Item was closed.

3.0 Exit Meeting Summary

On October 24, 2024, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Paul Ross, Project Director, and other members of TMI-2S staff. No proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

<u>Closed</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Summary</u>
05000320/2024002-01	2.0. b	Continued Review of TMI-2's Fire Protection Program

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

50.59 Screens

TMI2-EN-MPKG-M-00-0031, "Equipment Hatch Door Dampers," Rev 0

Completed Surveillances

TMI2-PM-000-180-WKPG-1002, "Fire Detection Functional Test Fire Alarm Panel FS-PNL-740," Completed 11/7/23, 5/9/24

TMI2-PM-000-30-WKPG-1005, "Inspect and Test Unit 2 Barriers and Doors," Rev 0, Completed 6/27/24, 7/18/24, 8/21/24

TMI2-PM-000-30-WKPG-1010, "Fire Extinguisher Inspections," Rev 0, Completed 6/27/24, 7/18/24, 8/14/24

Fire Protection Program Documents

TMI Unit 2 Pre-Fire Plans, May 2023 Edition

TMI2-FP-EVA-0001, "Three Mile Island Unit 2 Fire Protection Program Evaluation," Rev 2

TMI2-FP-PN-001, "TMI-2 Fire Protection Plan," Rev 2

Miscellaneous

MOU Between Exelon and Londonderry Volunteer Fire Company, 5/19/2020, modified to Constellation 8/23/23

TMI2-EN-RPT-FP-00-0007, "TMI-2 Fire Protection Program White Paper," Rev 0

Procedures

TMI2-FP-PR-006, "TMI-2 Fire Extinguisher Inspection," Rev 2

TMI2-FP-PR-007, "TMI-2 Fire Barrier and Door Inspection," Rev 1

TMI2-FP-PR-015, "TMI-2 Control of Transient Combustible Material," Rev 2

TMI2-OP-PR-028, "Response to TMI-2 Alarms," Rev 1

TMI2-OP-PR-058, "TMI-2 Fire Detection Functional Test," Rev 1

TMI2-OP-PR-059, "TMI-2 Fire Protection System Operation," Rev 0

Self-Assessments

TMI2-MA-FASA-2023-0011, "TMI2 Fire Protection Program Assessment"

TMI2-QA-SUR-2024-0003, "Fire Protection Program," Rev 0

TMI2-QA-SUR-2024-0018, "Fire Protection Program," Rev 1

Transient Combustible Permits

24-013
24-018
24-037
24-044
24-057
24-064
24-072

Work/Mod Packages

TM12-EN-MPKG-M-00-0031, "Equipment Hatch Door Dampers," Rev 1
TM12-PM-000-365-WKPG-1224-0, "Annual Reviews of TMI-2 Pre-Fire Plans," Rev 0
TM12-PM-000-365-WKPG-1257-0, "Annual Fire Protection Program FASA," Rev 0
TM12-PM-170-1460- WKPG-1263-0, "Clean and Test CACE Fire Dampers," Rev 0