UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD, SUITE 102
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415

April 24, 2025

Jeff Richardson
President
TMI-2 Solutions, LLC and Energy Solutions, LLC
121 West Trade Street
Charlotte, NC 28202

SUBJECT: TMI-2 SOLUTIONS, LLC, THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000320/2025001

Dear Jeff Richardson:

On March 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection under Inspection Manual Chapter 2561, "Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program," at the permanently shutdown Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2). The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, and plant walk-downs. The results of this inspection were discussed with Paul Ross, Executive Project Director, and other members of your staff on April 7, 2025, and are described in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, one violation of NRC requirements of very low safety significance (Severity Level IV) is documented in this report. Because of the very low safety significance and because TMI-2 Solutions, LLC (TMI-2S) entered this issue into its corrective action program and the violation was not willful or repetitive, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission – Region I; and the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC public Document Room or from the NRC document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

No reply to this letter is required. Please contact Katherine Warner of my staff at (610) 337-5389 if you have any questions regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

ELISE EVE Digitally signed by ELISE EVE
Date: 2025.04.24 07:18:48 -04'00'

Elise Eve, Team Leader
Decommissioning Team
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor
Health Physics Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Docket No. 05000320

License No. DPR-73

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000320/2025001

SUBJECT: TMI-2 SOLUTIONS, LLC, THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000320/2025001 DATED APRIL 24, 2025

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket No.	05000320
License No.	DPR-73
Report No.	2025001
Licensee:	TMI-2 Solutions, LLC (TMI-2S)
Facility:	Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Location:	Middletown, PA 17057
Inspection Dates:	January 1, 2025, to March 31, 2025
Inspectors:	H. Anagnostopoulos, CHP, Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security R. Rolph, Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security A. Turilin, Reactor Inspector Engineering Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety K. Warner, CHP, Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Accompanied By:	N. Harmon, CHP, Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Approved By:	Elise Eve, Team Leader Decommissioning Team Decommissioning, ISFSI and Reactor Health Physics Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TMI-2 Solutions, LLC (TMI-2S)
Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2)
NRC Inspection Report No. 05000320/2025001

A routine announced decommissioning inspection was completed on March 31, 2025, at Three Mile Island Unit 2. The inspection included a review of design changes, problem and identification and resolution, decommissioning performance and status, Material Control and Accountability, fire protection, and occupational radiation exposure. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, and site walk-downs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) program for overseeing the safe decommissioning of a permanently shutdown nuclear power reactor is described in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2561, "Decommissioning Power Reactor Inspection Program."

List of Violations

The inspectors determined that one Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1) occurred for the licensee's failure to reasonably prevent fires from occurring. Specifically, TMI-2S did not properly implement site procedure TMI2-SH-PR-064, "TMI-2 Hot Work Control," Revision 3. The failure to implement the site procedure resulted in a fire in the TMI-2 reactor building. TMI-2S entered this issue into its corrective action program as CR-2025-0156.

REPORT DETAILS

1.0 Background

In December 1993, TMI-2 received a possession-only license from the NRC to enter Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS). On December 18, 2020, the license for TMI-2 was transferred from GPU Nuclear, Inc. to TMI-2 Solutions (TMI-2S) (ADAMS No. ML20352A381). On March 31, 2023, an amended license was issued removing TMI-2 from PDMS and allowing them to begin decommissioning activities (ADAMS No. ML23051A042).

TMI-2 is currently inspected under Category 3, "Decommissioning (DECON), No Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool" as described in IMC 2561.

2.0 Active Decommissioning Performance and Status Review

The inspectors performed onsite decommissioning inspection activities on January 27 – 29, February 6, and March 24 - 27, 2025 supplemented by in-office reviews and periodic phone calls. The inspection consisted of observations by the inspectors, interviews with site personnel, a review of procedures and records, and site walk-downs.

2.1 Inspection Procedure (IP) 37801, "Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications at Permanently Shutdown Reactors"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted document reviews and interviews with site personnel to determine if TMI-2 procedures and processes, including training and qualifications, were adequate and in accordance with the requirements associated with 10 CFR 50.59. The inspectors reviewed a sampling of changes to determine if changes made by TMI-2 under 10 CFR 50.59 required prior NRC approval.

b. Observations

The inspectors determined that the reviewed process applicability screenings and 10 CFR 50.59 screenings had been adequately performed. Those reviewed included modifications to the liquid radwaste system and reactor building ventilation. Specifically, TMI-2S screened modifications to the liquid radwaste system to establish or modify existing pathways to allow for transfer or liquids between the reactor building sump, the auxiliary building sump, and spent fuel pool A for the eventual treatment of liquid radwaste generated in the reactor building. The inspectors noted that the screening stated that the modifications would not result in an unanticipated liquid release to the environment because they are contained within the auxiliary and fuel handling buildings. Additional design changes reviewed included the reactivation of a purge supply fan and modifications of the reactor building exhaust suction point to a lower elevation. The inspectors noted that these changes were designed to improve ventilation air flow within the reactor building while maintaining negative pressure in the reactor building. The inspectors noted that there were no 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations written since the last design change inspection. The inspectors determined that TMI-2S had appropriately trained and maintained qualified individuals to perform the screenings and evaluations.

c. Conclusions

No violations of more than minor significance were identified.

2.2 IP 40801, "Problem Identification and Resolution at Permanently Shutdown Reactors"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the implementation and effectiveness of TMI-2's corrective action program (CAP) by reviewing a sampling of issues, non-conformances, and any conditions adverse to quality that were entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed a representative selection of CAP documents, including one root cause analysis report and several apparent cause analysis reports, to determine if a sufficiently low threshold for problem identification existed, if follow-up evaluations were of sufficient quality, and if TMI-2 assigned timely and appropriate prioritization for issue resolution commensurate with issue significance. The inspectors attended several management review committee meetings, including one corrective action review board, to determine if TMI-2 management was adequately engaged in issue disposition and resolution. The inspectors interviewed site personnel who are responsible for the CAP program.

The inspectors reviewed site audits for the past year to determine if they were thorough, reported to management, and that corrective actions were initiated by quality assurance staff where necessary. The inspectors confirmed that audits are being performed in accordance with the schedule that is outlined in the quality assurance program plan.

The inspectors interviewed the Employee Concerns Program representative and several employees to assess the site safety culture.

b. Observations

The inspectors determined that issues had been identified, entered into the CAP, and evaluated in a manner which is commensurate with their safety significance through a document review and discussion with TMI-2S staff. The inspectors found that condition report screening process was applying classification levels to the issues at an appropriate level. The inspectors noted that root cause and apparent cause evaluations were being performed with a suitable threshold for initiation, and with robust management support. The inspectors observed an active posture of issue ownership and peer challenge during the corrective action review board meeting.

The inspectors witnessed ample management engagement during management review committee meetings.

The inspectors determined that the quality assurance organization was sufficiently independent and that the audits and self-assessments conducted included appropriate scrutiny of licensee performance. The inspectors verified that audits were performed by qualified individuals independent of the organization being audited and that management reviewed the audits, self-assessments, and associated corrective actions. The inspectors verified that the audits and self-assessments were performed in the appropriate timeframe and any weaknesses identified were captured within the CAP. The inspectors noted that the site quality assurance organization was active, intrusive, generated condition reports were appropriate, and were challenging the project to improve performance were necessary.

The inspectors noted during the inspection period that self-assessments that were conducted by the radiation protection organization showed good participation by staff, were comprehensive, and added value.

The inspectors determined that the site had an appropriate focus on a safety conscious work environment and that employees were free to raise concerns.

c. Conclusions

No violations of more than minor significance were identified.

2.3 IP 64704, "Fire Protection Program at Permanently Shutdown Reactors"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector responded to the site on February 11, 2025, upon notification of a fire in the Unit 2 reactor building. The inspector conducted observations of the initial response, interviewed personnel, and reviewed applicable procedures to determine whether TMI-2S was appropriately responding to the fire and addressing the potential consequences. The inspectors also reviewed whether work prior to the fire was performed in accordance with the applicable fire protection program implementing procedures. The inspector reviewed initial radiological, contamination, and airborne survey results, personnel whole body counts, and Unit 2 station ventilation exhaust samples to determine the severity of the consequences of the fire, including any impact to public and occupational health and safety and whether radioactive material spread to the environment.

b. Observations

The inspector determined that TMI-2S adequately responded to the fire and there was no impact on occupational and public health and safety and no spread of contamination to the environment. The inspector noted that no or negligible radioactive materials were identified in the following: (1) airborne radioactive contamination surveys taken inside the Unit 2 reactor building; (2) airborne radioactive contamination surveys taken inside and outside the Containment Air Control Envelope (CACE); (3) contamination and radiological surveys in the CACE building; and (4) samples from the Unit 2 station ventilation exhaust. Personal air sampling results, clearance from the area by whole body contamination monitoring and internal dose monitoring by whole body counting of workers in the area indicate that no intake of radioactive material or external contamination of the workers occurred. Altogether, the inspector determined that the overall impact of the fire was negligible. The inspector noted that TMI-2S had camera views on the fire throughout the duration of the event. The inspector determined that TMI-2S procedures were not properly implemented for the hot work in the reactor building, which resulted in the fire and constituted a violation as described below.

Violation

The inspector determined that one Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1) occurred for the licensee's failure to reasonably prevent fires from occurring. Specifically, TMI-2S did not properly implement site procedure TMI2-SH-PR-064, "TMI-2 Hot Work Control," Revision 3 to (1) ensure additional combustible material met the required minimum distance from ignition sources or otherwise adequately protected and (2) provide adequate oversight of hot work and mitigating controls. The failure to implement the site procedure resulted in a fire in the TMI-2 reactor building.

On February 11, 2025, a crew on the 305’ of the reactor building performed hot work as part of the equipment hatch expansion project. Specifically, the crew (standing on an elevated work platform) used an oxyacetylene scrapping torch to cut the metal reactor building liner. A fire watch was assigned and performed their duties remotely via video cameras. The pre-job verifications required by procedure of the job supervisor and the fire marshal were done remotely via video cameras in lieu of a site walkdown. A fire extinguisher was located approximately 50 feet away from the workers and overdue for a required inspection by two months. A fire was identified on the equipment hatch contamination curtain, which was bunched in the vicinity of the hot work and protected by material of insufficient heat resistance for the work being performed at that proximity. The licensee took immediate corrective actions, including: (1) evacuated the reactor building, (2) shut down the reactor building ventilation, (3) monitored the fire via video cameras, (4) left the fire to self-extinguish per the TMI-2 fire plan, (5) stopped all work onsite, and (6) performed an investigation of the fire. The fire burned off and on for several hours while remaining limited to the vicinity of the contamination curtain. The licensee entered the reactor building on February 12, 2025, discharged two fire extinguishers on the debris pile, and declared the fire to be extinguished.

The licensee performed air sampling and radiological surveys inside and outside the reactor building and an analysis of the Unit 2 station ventilation exhaust samples to determine whether there was a spread of contamination. The licensee conducted whole body counts of the workers performing the hot work to determine if an intake of radioactive material occurred. The inspectors reviewed the results and determined that they indicated no impacts to public or occupational health and safety. The inspectors noted that the area where the fire occurred had contamination levels less than 50,000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters and all workers in the reactor building wore powered air purifying respirators.

Title 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1) requires, in part, that licensees maintain a fire protection program to address the potential for fires that could cause the release or spread of radioactive materials, including reasonably preventing fires from occurring.

TMI-2 procedure TMI2-SH-PR-064, “TMI-2 Hot Work Control,” Revision 3 is a quality procedure that is part of the TMI-2 fire protection program used to meet 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1). TMI2-SH-PR-064 requires, in part, that (1) take extra precautions when performing hot work activities that produce molten material or large materials of slag; (2) fire watch personnel have an operable fire extinguisher in their possession throughout hot work; (3) fire watch personnel be present at the hot work activity other than exceptions after termination of the hot work activity; (4) job supervision inspect the hot work operation area, in part, to ensure combustible materials are either moved or otherwise protected; and (5) the Fire Marshall (or alternate) examine the hot work activity location to determine that the hot work can proceed in accordance the hot work control procedure and permit.

Contrary to the above, TMI-2S failed to implement several provisions of their hot work control procedure which resulted in a fire in the TMI-2 reactor building. Specifically, TMI-2S failed to follow TMI2-SH-PR-064 for the planning and execution of hot work to expand the reactor building equipment hatch in that: (1) the combustible contamination control curtain was not removed or otherwise adequately protected from hot work activities where a fire blanket is insufficient; (2)(3) the fire watch was being conducted remotely where camera angles could not reasonably identify a fire in the incipient stage and the fire extinguisher was approximately 50 feet away from the work site; and (4)(5) neither the job supervision nor the Fire Marshall designee performed an adequate field walk down prior to signing the hot work permit.

This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation using Section 6.3.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy, dated August 23, 2024, regarding the failure to implement

procedures, which has a low safety significance. This determination was made because the consequences of the fire were limited to the immediate area of the hot work, there were no occupational dose impacts, and there was no spread of radioactive material to the public or the environment.

Because this violation was determined to be of relatively inappreciable safety consequences, was entered into the licensee's CAP as CR-2025-0156, and the violation was not willful or repetitive, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation consistent with 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy (**NCV 05000320/2025001-001, Failure to reasonably prevent fires from occurring in the reactor building**).

c. Conclusions

One Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.48(f)(1) was identified.

2.4 IP 71801 "Decommissioning Performance and Status Reviews at Permanently Shutdown Reactors"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the accessible areas of the reactor building, fuel handling building, and turbine building to assess field conditions and decommissioning activities by assessing material condition of structures, systems, and components, housekeeping, system configurations, and worker level of knowledge or procedure use and adherence. The inspectors observed select pre-job briefings and associated work activities, including removal of cover plates on spent fuel pool A in the fuel handling building and the decontamination, rigging, and removal of several defueling canister sleeves from the defueling carousel (located under the shielded work platform in the reactor cavity).

b. Observations

The inspectors noted that during this inspection period, TMI-2S continued decontamination and removal of interferences and canister sleeves from the carousel under the shielded work platform in the reactor cavity, continued construction of the Decommissioning Support Building, and began removal of the plates and beams that served as a cover for spent fuel pool A (during post defueled monitored storage). The inspectors noted that, for the areas of the plant toured, the material condition and housekeeping were adequate. The inspectors determined that the work activities observed were conducted in accordance with TMI-2 procedures and controls.

c. Conclusions

No violations of more than minor significance were identified.

2.5 IP 83750, "Occupational Radiation Exposure at Permanently Shutdown Reactors"

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed any major changes to the radiation protection organization, personnel, staffing levels, facilities, equipment, and programs which had occurred since the last similar inspection. The inspectors interviewed the radiation protection (RP) manager, the RP technical programs manager, and the RP operations manager to assess their education, experience, and qualifications.

The inspectors conducted selected site walk-downs, including the accessible portions of the reactor building, to assess the adequacy of radiological postings and the adequacy of access controls for high radiation areas. The inspectors observed use of continuous air monitors (ICAMS) in the field and determined whether the placement was adequate. The inspectors observed the portable ventilation equipment at the spent fuel pool area and at the containment personnel hatch. The inspectors observed RP technicians performing job coverage and surveys to determine if implementation of radiological work controls, training and skill level, and instrumentation were sufficient for the activities being performed. The inspectors reviewed radiation work permits and associated as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) plans to determine if radiation work activities were pre-planned effectively and adequately control radiation worker exposures.

The inspectors attended Station ALARA Committee (SAC) meeting 2025-05 to observe and assess the level of management involvement and commitment to limiting ionizing radiation exposures to levels which are ALARA. The inspectors reviewed radiation exposure budgeting, progress against established goals, high-level work sequencing, schedules, and the content of ALARA plan 24-429 Revision 1. The inspectors reviewed SAC meeting minutes for meeting 2025-01 to confirm the fulfillment of procedural requirements.

The inspectors reviewed all available radiation protection technical basis documents. These documents are generated to collect information and then assess the radiological environment for project work. The assessments are then translated into strategies which are implemented into procedures and work control documents such that the regulations in 10 CFR Part 20 are satisfied. These are foundational technical documents. The review focused on the following:

- TMI2-RP-RPT-2023-0006, “Requirements for When to Use Specific Lens of the Eye Protection”
- TMI2-RP-RPT-2024-0005, “Sensitivity Study Using Cs-137 Sources and Canberra Model 2257A Whole Body Counter Calibration Phantom”
- TMI2-RP-RPT-2024-0003, “Reactor and Fuel Handling/Auxiliary Building Characterization Data Analysis”
- TMI-RP-RPT-2023-0003, “Revision to TMI2 PPE Material Beta Attenuation Report TMI2-RP-RPT-2022-001”

The inspectors reviewed radiation protection program self-assessments TMI2-RP-FASA-2024-0004, 0005, and 0006.

The inspectors reviewed dose records to determine if occupational doses were within regulatory limits. These included records of shallow dose equivalent, the skin dose calculation technique used, and Lens Dose Equivalent records data as well as special dosimetry applications including multiple dosimetry applications, and applications including relocation of dosimetry and application relative to dose rate gradients.

The inspectors observed several instrument source checks and calibrations to assess function and proper use of the instruments.

The inspectors reviewed documentation associated with external/internal dosimetry. The inspectors reviewed the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accreditations for ionizing radiation dosimetry used at TMI-2.

The inspectors reviewed the whole body count log, associated quality checks (background and source check) and results in addition to the library of isotopes to evaluate site assessment of gamma emitting isotope dose impact.

b. Observations

The inspectors noted that TMI-2S has a measured and reasoned plan to add additional radiation protection technician and technical resources to the project.

The inspectors confirmed that radiological work planning and supervisor oversight were efficacious and appropriate to the level of radiological risk to be encountered during project work. Radiation work permits and associated ALARA planning documents contained detailed instructions and the precautions that would be expected for higher-risk radiological activities.

The inspectors observed that the SAC meetings were collegial while challenging, with the desired level of management commitment to the ALARA effort.

The inspectors determined that significant progress had been made in addressing previous NRC observations regarding the content and technical rigor of RP technical basis documents. The NRC noted that several efforts to collect additional technical information had been initiated by TMI-2s and were underway at the time of inspection. The inspectors made additional observations which were documented by TMI-2S in condition reports CR-2025-0318, 0320, and 0321.

The inspectors noted that radiation protection self-assessments were comprehensive, exhibited good participation by RP personnel, and added value to the program.

The inspectors reviewed six evaluations of internal exposures and determined that the resultant doses were all within federal limits and properly documented in the annual dose report. There was one plant location where personnel dosimetry was relocated based on radiation dose gradient data required it. The associated survey was reviewed and verified to result in appropriate application of relocation.

The inspectors noted that at the time of the inspection, TMI-2 did not have an intake review ongoing. However, the inspectors noted that the site has a process in place to review an intake. TMI-2 technical personnel were able to describe their processes and actions taken in the immediate aftermath of a personnel intake. Technicians demonstrated proficiency in evaluating potential intakes through lapel air sample analysis and invivo whole body counting.

The inspectors determined that the licensee performance of source and calibration checks were adequately performed, and the staff conducting these activities was sufficiently knowledgeable of the instruments and the site procedures. The inspectors determined the temporary ventilation equipment was properly tested and properly placed to remove airborne activity.

c. Conclusions

No violations of more than minor significance were identified.

2.6 IP 85103, “Material Control and Accounting at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors”

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors examined the programs, processes, procedures, and records related to the Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This program is specified in 10 CFR 74.19, with the objective of preventing the loss or misuse of SNM. This included a review SNM custodians qualifications records, annual physical inventory reports, independent verification by physical observation that onsite special nuclear material is at the location specified in the inventory reports and verification that the site has submitted the required material status and transaction reports (DOE/NRC 741 and 742) to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System database for receipt or shipment of all special nuclear material of one gram or more.

b. Observations

The inspectors determined that MC&A program records were complete, comprehensive, and maintained in accordance with regulations and local procedures. Routine reports of SNM inventory and mass-balance to the U.S. DOE and the NRC were made as required. Item control areas were posted and had adequate access control. The program of SNM security seals was adequately maintained and seals observed in the field were in satisfactory condition, legible and lacked evidence of tampering. The inspectors performed physical observation of several SNM storage locations and determined that the material was at the designated locations and were relatively easy to locate.

c. Conclusions

No violations of more than minor significance were identified.

3.0 Exit Meeting Summary

On April 7, 2025, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Paul Ross, Executive Project Director, and other members of the TMI-2S organization. No proprietary information was documented in this report.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

None.

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

TMI2-SH-PR-064, TMI-2 Hot Work Control, Revision 3

Issue Reports Reviewed

CR-2025-0156

Issue Reports Generated from Inspection

CR-2025-0091
CR-2025-0093
CR-2025-0318
CR-2025-0320
CR-2025-0321

Miscellaneous

TMI2-EN-MPKG-M-00-0033, RB Duct Modifications, Revision 1
TMI2-EN-MPKG-M-00-0041, TMI2 Reactor Building Sump Draining System, Revision 0
TMI2-EN-MPKG-E-00-0044, Reactor Building Purge Supply Fan 2AH-E-12A Reactivation, Revision 0
TMI2-SH-HWP-2025-0035, TMI-2 Hot Work Permit for EH Liner Cutting and Burning, dated February 11, 2025
ICAM Filter Fire 25-0039, February 12, 2025
2HP-R-219 Event Driven Gas Sample, February 11, 2025
PA108-250212-R-0263, TMI-2 Radiological Survey, dated February 12, 2025
RB100-250210-J-0255, TMI-2 Radiological Survey, dated February 10, 2025
CY-TM-130-9780, Tritium by Liquid Scintillation, U2 Unit Vent – Event Driven, dated February 11, 2025
109504, Investigation Apex-InVivo, dated February 11, 2025
109508, Investigation Apex-InVivo, dated February 11, 2025
TMI2-RP-ASAS-2025-0619, I/S CACE GA Fire, dated February 11, 2025
TMI2-RP-ASAS-2025-0620, O/S CACE Building GA Fire, dated February 11, 2025
TMI2-RP-ASAS-2025-0621, PSOT Fire O/S CACE Building GA, dated February 11, 2025
PA108-250212-R-0263, 305’ CACE Building and U2 RB EQ Hatch, February 12, 2025
RB200-25012-J-0265, 347’ Reactor Building General Area, February 12, 2025
RB100-250212-J-0264, 305’ Reactor Building General Area, February 12, 2025
RB100-0211-AS-25-0625, Reactor Building, February 12, 2025
RB100-0211-AS-25-0622, Reactor Building, February 12, 2025