Peach Bottom - SCRAM - Turbine Trip
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/29/2024 - 01/30/2024
01/29/2024 - 01/30/2024
EVENT NUMBERS
56936
56936
Power Reactor
Event Number: 56936
Facility: Peach Bottom
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Eli Digon
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: Eli Digon
HQ OPS Officer: Natalie Starfish
Notification Date: 01/29/2024
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2024
Event Time: 12:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2024Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys ActuationPerson (Organization):
Dentel, Glenn (R1DO)
Notification Time: 13:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/29/2024
Event Time: 12:02 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2024Emergency Class: Non Emergency
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS Actuation - Critical
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - Valid Specif Sys ActuationPerson (Organization):
Dentel, Glenn (R1DO)
|
Unit
|
SCRAM Code
|
RX Crit
|
Initial PWR
|
Initial RX Mode
|
Current PWR
|
Current RX Mode
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2
|
A/R
|
Y
|
100
|
Power Operation
|
0
|
Hot Shutdown
|
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 1202 EDT on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram caused by a main turbine trip. Investigation is still ongoing."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All control rods were fully inserted. The licensee indicated that the turbine trip may have been caused by a power load imbalance, however the cause of the incident is under investigation. The scram was not complex.
Decay heat is currently being removed thru bypass valves dumping to the Main Condenser. Initially unit 2 lost the use of the bypass valves due to lack of condenser vacuum. Unit 2 used the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system in the condenser storage tank (CST) to CST mode to remove decay heat. Residual heat removal was used to keep the torus cool. Condenser vacuum was regained and unit 2 is back to removing decay heat with the turbine bypass valves.
There was no impact to unit 3.
The licensee confirmed there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * *UPDATE ON 01/29/24 AT 1935 EST FROM PAUL BOKUS TO NATALIE STARFISH* * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email;
Licensee adds 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation report to original 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation report.
"At approximately 1202 EDT on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram by a main turbine trip. All control rods inserted. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) was manually initiated for level control. HPCI was manually initiated for pressure control. Passive core injection system (PCIS) Group II and III isolations occurred (Specified System Actuation). Investigation is ongoing."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At approximately 1202 EDT on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram caused by a main turbine trip. Investigation is still ongoing."
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
All control rods were fully inserted. The licensee indicated that the turbine trip may have been caused by a power load imbalance, however the cause of the incident is under investigation. The scram was not complex.
Decay heat is currently being removed thru bypass valves dumping to the Main Condenser. Initially unit 2 lost the use of the bypass valves due to lack of condenser vacuum. Unit 2 used the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system in the condenser storage tank (CST) to CST mode to remove decay heat. Residual heat removal was used to keep the torus cool. Condenser vacuum was regained and unit 2 is back to removing decay heat with the turbine bypass valves.
There was no impact to unit 3.
The licensee confirmed there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * *UPDATE ON 01/29/24 AT 1935 EST FROM PAUL BOKUS TO NATALIE STARFISH* * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via email;
Licensee adds 8-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation report to original 4-hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation report.
"At approximately 1202 EDT on 01/29/24, unit 2 experienced a reactor scram by a main turbine trip. All control rods inserted. Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) was manually initiated for level control. HPCI was manually initiated for pressure control. Passive core injection system (PCIS) Group II and III isolations occurred (Specified System Actuation). Investigation is ongoing."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
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