CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1; DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3; LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2; LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2; OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION; PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3; AND QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS REGARDING ADOPTION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE TRAVELER, TSTF-535, "REVISE SHUTDOWN MARGIN DEFINITION TO ADDRESS ADVANCED FUEL DESIGNS" {TAC NOS. MF2533, MF2534, MF2535, MF2536, MF2537, MF2538, MF2539, MF2540, MF2541, MF2542, MF2543, AND MF2544)
Reassignment of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief For Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, and Limerick Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
Ironically, the NRC announced on Groundhog Day that it was dispatching a special inspection team to Pilgrim to investigate the reasons for the initial loss of the offsite power lines and ensuing problems the operators encountered, including the failure of the HPCI system, the inability to open one safety relief valve from the control room, and the failure of the standby diesel powered compressor to start. Like Bill Murray’s character in the feature film Groundhog Day, Pilgrim seems to be reliving certain things over and over. And over. And over.
For immediate release: Thursday, December 11, 2014
Contact: Paul Gunter, Director
Federal Nuclear Regulator Opts Not To Reconsider Critical Safety Enhancements at U.S. “Fukushima” Reactors
Decision designed to save industry money but exclude experts and public
TAKOMA PARK, MD -- The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has buckled to industry pressure and will recommend that the Commission disallow independent experts and the public from participating in a process to reconsider minimal but critical safety enhancements at the nation’s Fukushima-style nuclear power plants.
The NRC staff today said that a rulemaking proposed by the NRC Commission to further analyze filtered venting for containment protection and radiation release reduction following a severe accident is “not necessary.” The nuclear industry has vehemently opposed the installation of external filtered containment vents on the basis of cost and “unintended consequences.”
Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Emergency Plan Definition of Annual Training (TAC NOS. MF3003, MF30004, MF3005, MF3006, MF3007, MF3008, MF3009, and MF3010)
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Issuance of Amendment to Eliminate Certain Technical Specifications Reporting Requirements (TAC NO. MF0628)
During the 1960s when the American Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards debated containment structures, some members argued for the need to make stronger containments. Regrettably, a majority of the members believed that the emergency core cooling systems were adequate, so more than 50 years ago the Advisory Committee ignored its minority members and pushed ahead without rigorous failure-proof containment structures and systems. The Nuclear Regulatory Committee made the decision not to require stronger containments. Japan followed the American lead.
